Poised on the Precipice: A Critical Examination of Privacy Litigation by Serwin, Andrew B.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 25 | Issue 4 Article 7
2009
Poised on the Precipice: A Critical Examination of
Privacy Litigation
Andrew B. Serwin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Andrew B. Serwin, Poised on the Precipice: A Critical Examination of Privacy Litigation, 25 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 883 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol25/iss4/7
ARTICLES
POISED ON THE PRECIPICE: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF PRIVACY LITIGATION
Andrew B. Serwin t
Abstract
The ever-increasing use of information, coupled with changes in
computing technology that make information easier to use, and more
portable, ensure that privacy litigation will be a focus of government
enforcement and plaintiffs in years to come. This article examines
trends in privacy litigation, common theories of liability, damage
issues faced by plaintiffs, as well as an examination of class action
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issues as plaintiffs typically frame their allegations in the class action
context.
I. INTRODUCTION
A collection of factors has caused the United States to be poised
on the precipice of a new wave of litigation-litigation arising from the
improper use or collection of information. Public concern over
privacy is ever increasing while, and some would say because,
information has become critical to our everyday existence. In what is
now a self-reinforcing cycle, increased public concern has caused an
exponential increase in regulations, and the new regulations have
caused increased attention and public concern because many of the
new laws require public disclosure of security breaches, which
increases societal concerns over privacy.
Security breach laws, the laws that mandate public disclosure of
data incidents, provide the best example of the increase in regulation.
Just a few short years ago, California passed the first security breach
law. Now, 43 other states, the City of New York, Washington, D.C.,
and Puerto Rico, have adopted laws and many other countries have
either adopted, or are likely to adopt, security breach laws as well.
Laws restricting the collection and use of social security numbers
provide another example as more than 35 states have adopted these
types of laws.
Whether the increasing public concern over privacy is caused by,
or reflected in, the new privacy laws, the phenomenal expansion in
the number of privacy laws will have a predictable effect-a geometric
increase in the number of privacy laws will result in an equally
geometric increase in the number of violations of privacy laws. As
violations increase, there is an equally predictable consequence-
increased incentives for individuals to attempt to enforce these new
rights.
One of the first challenges in privacy litigation is to define what
"privacy" litigation actually is. While consumer-based privacy
litigation gains much of the attention, to focus exclusively on
consumer-oriented privacy litigation misses half the picture. The
increase in value of information has increased the number of
businesses that are bringing litigation to protect their intellectual
capital and their networks. Though these claims are not thought of as
"privacy" litigation in the traditional sense, these claims are no less
about the improper use of information than actions brought by
individuals. This litigation is frequently brought under the Computer
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Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
CAN-SPAM, and unfair competition law, including portions of the
Lanham Act.
In the privacy realm, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
serves as the primary federal privacy enforcer. However, the FTC
does not have unlimited resources, privacy is not its only
responsibility, and the actual number of enforcement actions is not as
high as one might guess. As a result, state attorney generals have an
important role to play in privacy enforcement. However, with limited-
exceptions, state attorney generals have not brought a significant
number of privacy matters. As a result, enforcement in many cases
falls to private plaintiffs, and they play a role in enforcing privacy
laws where violations are alleged to have occurred.
However, the road to plaintiffs' recovery in privacy litigation is
littered with a number of issues that can derail a case before it truly
starts, not the least of which is that plaintiffs in many cases cannot
prove actual damage, and may actually lack standing to bring an
action. Moreover, even if the case clears this hurdle, many class
actions fail the certification requirements because of issues unique to
privacy litigation.
This article examines the common theories of privacy litigation,
the issues faced by plaintiffs, and examines class action issues
generally, as well as some class issues that are unique to privacy
litigation. While privacy cases have had mixed success, the increased
importance of information, coupled with increased public attention,
and the ever-increasing number of privacy laws guarantees that we
will be stepping off of the precipice and into privacy litigation.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVACY LITIGATION
While the volume of privacy litigation has recently grown, and
the theories underlying cases have changed, privacy litigation has a
long history at common law. Many prior privacy cases were
predominantly founded upon common law theories and the
Restatement of Torts. Now, while common law still plays a role,
many theories of privacy litigation rely upon statutory violations. This
article first examines the history of privacy litigation under common
law, and then the common statutory theories are examined, as are
other theories that are not exclusively statutory. The issues private
plaintiffs face in bringing privacy litigation are examined, as are class
certification issues, and finally privacy issues arising from class
action discovery are also examined.
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III. PRIVACY LITIGATION AT COMMON LAW
The Restatement (Second) view of tort liability for privacy
violations is generally consistent with state common law. 1
Specifically, the Restatement recognizes four distinct areas of
liability: intrusion upon seclusion; appropriation of name or likeness;
publicity given to private life; and publicity placing person in false
light.
2
The Restatement formulation of an intrusion upon seclusion
finds liability where a person intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.3 It should be noted that liability does not depend
upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded. This
claim consists solely of an intentional interference with his interest in
solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs
or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man.
4
Liability for invasion of privacy based on appropriation of name
or likeness exists when a person appropriates to his own use or benefit
the name or likeness of another. 5 This typically arises when a person
inappropriately uses a person's name or takes a photograph of a
person and uses it in an inappropriate way without consent. The
Restatement notes that the interest protected here is interest of the
individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, as it is represented
by his name or likeness, to the extent that the use may be of benefit to
him or to others.6
Liability under the Restatement formulation can arise for
publicity given to private life if one gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another, if the matter publicized is of a
kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and is not
of legitimate concern to the public. 7 The Restatement notes that this
principal may not be consistent with the free speech rights afforded to
1. See Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914 (Cal. 2006).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977).
3. See id. § 652B cmt. a.
4. See id. § 652B.
5. See id. § 652C.
6. See id. § 652C cmt. a.
7. See id. § 652D.
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individuals under the federal Constitution, as well as the rights of a
free press.8
Finally, the Restatement imposes liability for publicity placing a
person in false light. The elements of this tort are met if a person
gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light, if the false light in which the other
was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity
of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would
be placed.9
While the Restatement formulations are not binding in each
state, most states follow these elements in some form and have also
established common law liability that generally tracks these four
categories,' 0 so the Restatement is an important starting point to
understanding common law privacy claims.
IV. PRIVACY LITIGATION-A MODERN VIEW
Modem privacy litigation is no longer exclusively reliant upon
common law and the Restatement theories. Instead, it also relies upon
myriad statutes that provide private rights of action. The most
common are the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), ll as well as
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 12 and CAN-
SPAM,1 3 though other theories are also utilized.
A. The CFAA
The CFAA was an anti-hacking law that has grown well beyond
its original role. Now, it can serve as the basis of litigation by creative
plaintiffs' class action attorneys, as well as companies attempting to
protect their trade secrets. The law provides both civil and criminal
remedies. 14
Under the CFAA, it is a criminal act for anyone to intentionally
access a computer without authorization, or beyond the scope of any
8. See id. § 652D cmt. a.
9. See id. § 652E.
10. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914 (Cal. 2006).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(2006).
12. Id. §§ 2510-2522. (2006).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006).
14. For a more detailed discussion of these laws, please see ANDREW SERWIN,
INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 102-103 (2nd ed. West 2008).
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authority that has been granted, whether the computer is owned by the
government or not, if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign
communication. 5 It is also a criminal act to knowingly, and with the
intent to defraud, access a protected computer: (i) without
authorization; or (ii) beyond the scope of any authorization, if the
person furthers a fraud and an item of any value is obtained, if the
value obtained is over $5,000 in any one year period.' 6 Furthermore,
it is unlawful for a person to knowingly cause the transmission of a
program, code, or command that intentionally: (1) damages a
protected computer; (2) accesses a protected computer and recklessly
causes damage; or (3) accesses a protected computer without
authorization and causes resulting damage.17
1. Damage under the CFAA
The type of damage shown to establish a violation of this portion
of the CFAA must be one of the following types: aggregated damage
that exceeds $5,000; potential modification or impairment of a
medical diagnosis, examination, treatment or care of one or more
persons; physical injury; a threat to public health or safety; or damage
to a government computer that is used in furtherance of the
administration of justice, national defense, or national security. 8
There is no requirement that the damaged party have an ownership
interest in the computers which were accessed. In one case, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that there must be a
showing that the accessed computer belonged to the plaintiff. 9
Instead, it need only be shown that there was an act that violated the
CFAA and that the plaintiff suffered damage-e.g., damage that results
from the unauthorized access of data that is owned by the plaintiff,
but stored on another's computer.2 °
The Ninth Circuit has also held that any "natural and
foreseeable" expenses are part of the damages amounts that can be
considered.2' This includes impairments to the system, loss or
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C)-(a)(3) (2006).
16. See id. § 1030(a)(4); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,
450-51 (E.D. Va. 1998); YourNetDating, Inc. v. Mitchell, 88 F. Supp. 2d 870, 872 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii) (2006).
18. See id § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)-(v).
19. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004).
20. Id.
21. United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000).
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recreation of data, or creating a more secure network.22 However,
numerous courts have held that economic damages, and not emotional
distress or punitive damages, are recoverable.23 The Northern District
of California recently addressed whether forensic costs related to
identifying an anonymous user who misappropriated information
constituted "loss," ultimately concluding that such costs were indeed
a ,loss.,,24
In determining whether the requisite level of damage exists, a
court can consider the hourly wage of any employees who repair any
damage, even if the employees performed the repairs in the scope of
their normal duties and were not paid any additional amounts. 25 While
lost revenue, security checks, and other similar expenditures will not
count towards the damage requirement if there is no showing that
there was an actual compromise of the network, data, or programs on
the network.26 Other courts, however, have held that lost wages and
payment of consulting costs would count towards the damage
requirement, even if there is no physical damage. 27 Furthermore, other
costs may count towards the $5,000 requirement. Attorneys' fees for
bringing an action under the CFAA, however, do not count towards
the loss requirement.2 8
A case from the district court in the Northern District of Indiana
provides a good example of the issues faced by a plaintiff in a CFAA
claim. 29 This court considered the damage element for a § 1030(a)(5)
22. Id.
23. Garland-Sash v. Lewis, No. 05 Civ. 6827(WHP), 2007 WL 935013, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007) (citing In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497,
524 n.33 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); Letscher v. Swiss Bank Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8277(LBS), 1996 WL
183019, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1996).
24. Successfactors, Inc. v. Softscape, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
("In such cases courts have considered the cost of discovering the identity of the offender or the
method by which the offender accessed the protected information to be part of the loss for the
purpose of the CFAA.") (citing Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 963-64 (D.
Ariz. 2008)); cf Tyco Int'l (US), Inc. v. John Does, 1-3, No. 01 Civ. 3856 RCCDF, 2003 WL
21638205, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2003).
25. Middleton, 231 F.3d at 1214.
26. Moulton v. VC3, No. 1:00CV434-TWT, 2000 WL 33310901, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7,
2000); see also Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 477-478 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), affid, 166 F. App'x 559 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that lost revenue and remedial costs did
not constitute loss under CFAA).
27. Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2004); EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001).
28. Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 110 (D.R.I. 2006).
29. Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty, P.C. v. Mysliwy, 2:05-cv-00108-JTM-APR (N.D.
Ind. Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications/405e.pdf.
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claim in the context of alleged misconduct by an attorney as she
departed her former employer. 30 In Spangler, the defendant was a
partner in a law firm and was alleged to have taken proprietary
information, including client lists, and e-data files, before her
departure from the firm as part of her plan to set up a competing law
firm. 3 1 The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its CFAA
claim. 32 The court ultimately denied the request, noting that while the
plaintiff had alleged that it incurred costs to investigate the alleged
improper access, it did not show that there was any impairment of
data or the system that supported a finding of losses qualifying as
damage under § 1030(a)(5).33
The loss requirement under the CFAA for a civil action
continues to befuddle courts. Indeed, two federal courts issued
opinions on the issue within two days of each other, and reached
opposite conclusions even though they relied upon the same cases to
reach their conclusion. In P.C. of Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations! The
Party and Seasonal Superstore, L.L.C., 2007 WL 708978 (D.N.J.
2007), some former employees allegedly took trade secret and
confidential information regarding the plaintiffs' business and used it
to open up competing businesses.3 a The defendants brought a motion
to dismiss the CFAA claim, asserting that the plaintiffs failed to state
a claim under the CFAA, including because they had not
demonstrated any "loss" under § 1030(a)(5)(B)(1), as required by
§ 1030(g).35 The P.C. Yonkers court examined the Nexans Wires case,
as well as the Resdev case, and concluded that these cases made a
distinction between costs incurred as a result of an incident versus lost
revenue or other consequential damages.36 The court noted that loss is
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 13; see also Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, Inc., No. 6:04-CV-
137ORL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743, at *5 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Aug 10, 2005) (noting that damages
under CFAA requires some finding of "diminution in the completeness or usability of data or
information on a computer system"); Moulton v. VC3, No. I:00CV434-TWT, 2000 WL
33310901, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2000) (holding that investigative costs are disallowed as
damage under the CFAA where alleged incident did not result in "structural" damage to the
network).
34. P.C. of Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations! The Party and Seasonal Superstore, L.L.C., No.
04-4554(JAG), 2007 WL 708978, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2007).
35. Id. at *4.
36. The court stated, "As the Second Circuit found, 'the plain language of the [CFAA]
treats lost revenue as a different concept from incurred costs, and permits recovery of the former
only where connected to an interruption in service."' Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 166
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defined by the CFAA as "any reasonable cost to any victim, including
the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to
its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred,
or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of
service. 37 The court made a distinction when it concluded that the
"interruption of service" requirement applied only to the portion of
the definition that addresses "any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages," but not to any allegation that related to "the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment,
and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense. 38 Thus, the court read the definition of
loss to have two different components-one of which does not require
an interruption of service, if the loss relates to the costs of responding
to an offense conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense;
and a second component that includes lost revenue, incurred costs, or
other consequential damages that result from an interruption of
service.39 Under this definition, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had stated a claim under the CFAA. Notably, plaintiffs in this matter
never alleged there was either damage or an interruption of service,
but rather that they had suffered "substantial losses in excess of
$5,000, including but not limited to losses sustained in responding to
defendants' actions, investigating defendants' actions and taking
remedial steps to prevent defendants' further actions. ' 4° Nowhere did
plaintiff articulate how it had suffered damage to a computer or an
interruption of service.
Courts in the Ninth Circuit, however, continue to liberally pennit
claims under the CFAA where there is no clear allegation of system
interruption, and therefore loss, as other courts have held.4' Other
Fed.Appx. 559, 2006 WL 328292, at *4 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Civic Ctr. Motors, Ltd. v. Mason
Street Imp. Cars, Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 2d 378, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ruling that loss of
"competitive edge" claim not caused by computer impairment or computer damage was not
cognizable under the CFAA); Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, No. 04-CIV-1374, 2005 WL
1924743, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005) (similar)." Id. at *5.
37. P.C. of Yonkers, No. 04-4554(JAG), 2007 WL 708978, at *4 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(l 1) (2006)).
38. Id.
39. Id at *4-6.
40. Id. at *5.
41. See Therapeutic Research Faculty v. NBTY, 488 F. Supp. 2d 991 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
(citing Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126
2009]
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courts, however, continue to reject this line of cases.4 2 Either way, a
number of issues await plaintiffs who seek to recover under the
CFAA, though these issues are not insurmountable.
2. Examples of CFAA violations
a. Unauthorized Access to websites
The First Circuit upheld the granting of an injunction under the
CFAA against a defendant that had used a "scraper" program to
obtain confidential information from the plaintiffs website.43 The
information included pricing information that was obtained and used
to undercut the plaintiffs prices.44 The defendant had hired a former
executive from the plaintiff who had allegedly used knowledge of the
plaintiffs confidential information to assist in the development of the
"scraper" program in violation of a confidentiality agreement.45
b. Gathering of E-mail Addresses
In a case that predated the enactment of CAN-SPAM, a Virginia
District Court held that the defendants' harvesting of e-mail addresses
from other AOL customers violated the CFAA, because the sending
of large numbers of unsolicited commercial e-mails damaged AOL.46
(W.D. Wash. 2000)) (holding that a claim could be stated under the CFAA against a party that
exceeded authorized use of password and thereby obtained additional access to licensed
materials); see also PharMerica, Inc. v. Arledge, 2007 WL 865510, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21,
2007) (holding that an employer had demonstrated likelihood of success on CFAA claim where
an employee that downloaded confidential information to use with a competitor and deleted files
and records related to the downloading); H & R Block E. Enter., Inc. v. J & M Sees., LLC, 2006
WL 1128744, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 24,2006); Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp.
2d 435, 439 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Pacific Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188,
1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003), citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 578 (1st
Cir. 2001).
42. Cenveo Corp. v. CelumSolutions Software GMBH & Co KG, 504 F. Supp. 2d 574,
581 (D. Minn. 2007) (dismissing CFAA claim based upon improper access to an employer's
confidential information because the complaint did not allege an interruption of service, and
therefore failed to allege loss); see also Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty, P.C. v. Mysilwy, 2:05-
cv-00108-JTM-APR, at *12-13 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2006) (finding that allegations of
downloading of firm information by an attorney who was leaving her employer failed to
demonstrate a CFAA because there was no allegation of system impairment, and therefore no
loss).
43. EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 578-79.
44. Id. at 578.
45. Id.
46. Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,451 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("The facts
before the Court establish that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, which prohibits individuals from 'intentionally access[ing] a computer
EXAMINATION OF PRIVACY LITIGATION
c. Diversion of Customers/Harvesting of Customer
Lists
Diversion of customers can constitute a violation of the CFAA.
In one case, a former programmer for a dating service allegedly used
his knowledge of his former employer's software, as well as access
codes, to route customers from the dating service to an adult oriented
website.4 7 The court concluded that these allegations, if true,
constituted a violation of the CFAA.48
The improper gathering of customer lists can also constitute a
violation of the CFAA. One court has held that the use of "bots" to
obtain customer lists from the WHOIS database violated the CFAA.49
In a related example, a district court recently applied Verio, at the
pleading stage, finding on the allegations made in the case, that the
use of a spider could potentially bind a company to an online
agreement. 50
The use of "bots" to gather information, including pricing
information, in violation of the terms of use of a website can also
violate the CFAA. For example, a court found sufficient allegations to
support a claim for violation of the CFAA, where a company created
a software program that allowed customers to search for airline fares
online, and the data was obtained through the use of "bots," in
violation of a user agreement.
5 1
d Defective Software
In certain cases, courts have held that defective software, in
particular microcode, that causes damage to data on computers can
constitute a "transmission" of programs under § 1030(a)(5)(A), and
without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing] information
from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.'
Defendants' own admissions satisfy the Act's requirements. Defendants have admitted to
maintaining an AOL membership and using that membership to harvest the e-mail addresses of
AOL members. Defendants have stated that they acquired these e-mail addresses by using
extractor software programs. Defendants' actions violated AOL's Terms of Service, and as such
was unauthorized. Plaintiff contends that the addresses of AOL members are 'information'
within the meaning of the Act because they are proprietary in nature. Plaintiff asserts that as a
result of defendants' actions, it suffered damages exceeding $5,000, the statutory threshold
requirement.").
47. YourNetDating, Inc. v. Mitchell, 88 F. Supp. 2d 870, 870-71 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
48. Id. at 872.
49. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd as
modified, 356 F.3d 393,395 (2d Cir. 2004).
50. Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755, 765 (D. Colo. 2007).
51. Sw. Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
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therefore violate the CFAA. 2 Thus, the placement of a defective disk
controller software that allegedly caused damage to data on
computers could violate the CFAA. "Time bomb" codes in certain
cases can also violate the CFAA, though "time bomb" or other
disabling codes that are part of a disclosed licensing arrangement
would not likely fall within the CFAA.5 3
e. Setting of Cookies
The intentional placement of cookies on users' computers has
been sufficient to establish intent under the CFAA, though the court
ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate any
damage resulting from the placement of cookies.54 Other courts have
reached similar results regarding cookies, "action tags" and rerouting
of users through other servers, all of which allegedly breached the
users' web privacy.5 5 Similarly, a pharmaceutical company's use of
technology to obtain personal information from computers used to
access websites did not constitute a violation of the CFAA because
the users could not establish damage.5 6
f Authorized Users Exceeding Scope ofAuthority
This category of claims is mainly connected with employees
who exceed the scope of their authority. For example, the release of a
computer "worm" on the Internet violated CFAA because, though the
author had limited authority to access public Internet sites for
communication purposes, his actions exceeded the scope of his
authority.
5 7
g. Illegal Subpoenas
The CFAA has been applied to litigants who have issued
improper requests for information from ISPs. 58 In Theofel, a party
52. Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
53. See N. Tex. Preventive Imaging L.L.C. v. Eisenberg, 1996 WL 1359212, at *7 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 19, 1996).
54. In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
"damages" may be aggregated across all alleged victims, but only for each discrete act and each
act must meet the statutory damage requirements).
55. See, e.g., Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
56. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 14-15 (D. Mass. 2002),
rev'd, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
57. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
58. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
EXAMINATION OF PRIVACY LITIGATION
requested all e-mails, without any limitation upon time or subject
matter, from the opposing party's ISP. 59 The ISP provided a sample of
e-mails to the requesting party, many of which were privileged. 60 The
court held that an overbroad subpoena can constitute a violation of the
CFAA, in certain cases, because it exceeds the authorized access of
the requesting party.
61
h. Mere Review of Information
The mere review of information, even if not authorized, will not
give rise to liability under the CFAA if the individual receives
nothing of value.62 In Czubinski, the defendant was an employee of
the IRS that reviewed a number of individuals' personal tax data.
Though the court acknowledged that the defendant had exceeded his
authority when he reviewed tax payer's files, it concluded that his
action were not done to gain anything of value but rather to fulfill his
curiosity to see information about people he knew.63
i. Internet Advertising
Internet advertising has also served as the basis of a CFAA
claim. Cases have been brought against a company that improperly
accessed and copied data storage forms for Internet advertising
services. 64 This conduct, because it allegedly resulted in the advertiser
being forced to incur over $5,000 in assessment costs and corrective
actions, was sufficient to allege a CFAA violation.65
3. State Computer Crime Laws
Over 40 states have computer crime laws that criminalize
conduct in similar ways to the CFAA, though many do not have the
"interruption in service" requirement.66 A smaller subset of these laws
provide civil remedies and therefore can also serve as a basis for
59. Id. at 1071.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1078-79.
62. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997).
63. Id. at 1076.
64. See, e.g., I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp.
2d 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
65. Id. at 526.
66. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(5) (West 2007).
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privacy litigation. Examples of such laws are California Penal Code §
50267 and Virginia's computer crime laws.68
B. The ECPA
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 69 consists
of the Wiretap Act7° and the Stored Communications Act.71 The
individual portions of the ECPA are sometimes referred to as Title I
of the Act, the Wiretap Act, which exclusively applies to the
interception of communications, and Title II, the Stored
Communications Act, which applies to the dissemination or review of
stored communications.72 This is also a common claim made in
privacy litigation. As with the CFAA, this law provides both civil and
criminal remedies for violations.73
These acts regulate when electronic communications can be
monitored or reviewed by third-parties, including ISPs. Generally, it
is a crime for persons to intercept or procure electronic
communications, 74 which include e-mails and other electronic
messages and transmissions, unless certain exceptions apply.75 These
include: (1) if the communication is made through a system that is
readily accessible to the general public; 76 (2) to protect the rights or
property of the provider, although random monitoring cannot be
done; 77 (3) if a provider of an electronic communication service
reviews a communication to record the fact that a wire or electronic
communication was initiated or completed if the purpose is to protect
the provider, another provider, or a user, from fraudulent, unlawful or
abusive use of the service; 78 (4) by court order;79 (5) if the originator
67. See id. § 502.
68. See, VA CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.2 - 152.12.
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
70. Id.
71. Id. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
72. Hall v. EarthLink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 503 (2nd Cir. 2005); Organizacion Jd
Ltda. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 124 F.3d 354, 356 (2d Cir. 1997).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2507 (2006).
74. Id. § 2510(12) (2006) ("Electronic communication" is defined as "any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce.").
75. Id. § 2511 (1)(a) (2006).
76. Id. § 2511 (2)(g)(i).
77. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
78. Id. § 2511(2)0a)(ii).
79. Id. § 251 l(2)(a)(ii)(A).
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or addressee of any communication consents to the disclosure; (6) a
person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to
forward such communication to its destination (including
employers); 8' or (7) if a communication is inadvertently obtained and
the communication appears to pertain to the commission of a crime, if
the communication is divulged to law enforcement.82
1. Temporal Distinctions
Title I only applies to conduct that occurs at the precise time of
transmission.83 This is in contrast to conduct that violates Title II,
which relates to the improper acquisition of the contents of stored
communications-i.e., after their transmission.84 Thus, the difference
between the two titles is a temporal one and Title I applies only to the
interception or accessing of information while in transmission, while
Title II applies to the unauthorized access of stored
85
communications.
2. Public versus Private Service Providers
Another important distinction created by the ECPA lies in its
differing treatment of service providers that provide communication
services to the "public" and those that do not.86 "Public" service
providers face additional hurdles when monitoring or disclosing
communications. This is an important point for businesses, because
an employer that simply provides e-mail or other Internet services to
its employees would not be a service provider to the "public" and
therefore faces lesser restrictions and exposure.
80. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(ii).
81. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(iii).
82. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(iv).
83. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 459-60 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States. v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Mass. 1997) (drawing temporal distinction
between acquisition of communications during transmission under Title I and acquisition of
contents of communications in a non-contemporaneous manner under Title II).
84. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding
electronic communications are not intercepted when they are in electronic storage).
85. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. at 220-21.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006).
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3. The Wiretap Act
Except as otherwise specifically provided under the ECPA, it is
illegal for any person to: intentionally intercept; 87 endeavor to
intercept; or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral,88  or electronic communication; 89
intentionally use, endeavor to use, or procure any other person to use
or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device9" to
intercept any oral communication when the device is affixed to, or
transmits a signal through:
* a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire
communication; 9'
* the device transmits communications by radio, or interferes
with the transmission of the communication;
* the person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or
any component thereof has been sent through the mail or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce;
87. Id. § 2510(4) ("'[l]ntercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device.").
88. Id. § 2510(2) (."[O]ral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication ... ").
89. Id. § 2510(12)(A)-(D) ("'[E]lectronic communication' means any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include: (A) any wire or oral communication; (B)
any communication made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any communication from a
tracking device; or (D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a
communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds .... ).
90. d § 2510(5)(a)-(b) (."[E]lectronic, mechanical, or other device' means any device or
apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than (a)
any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i)
furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in
the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary
course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of
such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of
wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an
investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties; (b) a hearing aid or
similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal ... ").
91. Id. § 2510(1) ("'[W]ire communication' means any aural transfer made in whole or in
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including
the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged
in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce .... ).
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" the use takes place on the premises of any business or other
commercial establishment the operations of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce;
* the purpose is to obtain information relating to the operations.
of any business or other commercial establishment of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
" the person acts in the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession
of the United States. 92
It is also illegal to intentionally disclose, or endeavor to disclose,
the contents93 of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, if the
person knows, or has reason to know, that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this law. 94 Furthermore, it is illegal to
intentionally use, or endeavor to Use, the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, if the person knows or has reason to know
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire,
oral, or electronic communication in violation of this law.95 Finally, it
is a crime to intercept communications in order to interfere or impede
a criminal investigation if certain specified conditions are met.
96
Any person whose wire, oral or electronic communication is
improperly intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of
this law may recover from the person or entity, other than the United
States, that violated Title I any relief that may be appropriate.97 The
relief includes preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief,
damages, as set forth below, punitive damages in appropriate cases
and reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.98 Agents of the United States, and the states, are exempt
from liability.99
Actual or statutory damages are recoverable. Statutory damages
range from $50 to $1,000 for certain violations (those that relate to
92. Id. § 251 1(1)(a)-(b) (2006).
93. Id. § 2510(8) ("'[C]ontents", when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication ... ").
94. Id. §2511(1)(c).
95. Id. § 2511 (1)(d).
96. Id. § 2511(1)(e)(iv).
97. Id. § 2520(a) (2006).
98. ld. § 2520(b)(l)-(b)(3).
99. Id. § 2520(a).
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viewing of select satellite or radio broadcasts for example).'00 For
other violations, a court can award actual damages and any profits
made by the violator, or statutory damages in the amount of $100 per
day or $1 0,000-whichever is greater.' 01
4. Stored Communications Act
Except as set forth below, it is illegal to obtain, alter, or prevent
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in a system if a person intentionally accesses
without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided. 10 2 It is also illegal to intentionally
exceed an authorization to access that facility.' 03
a. Exceptions Permitting Disclosure
The Stored Communications Act does not apply to conduct
authorized by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service, or by a user of that service with respect to a
communication of or intended for that user. 104
A provider of electronic communication service may disclose the
contents of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic
storage pursuant to a validly issued warrant if it is in storage for 180
days or less.
10 5
If the communication is more than 180 days old, sent via
electronic transmission'0 6 by a subscriber or customer of a remote
computing service, 10 7 and was retained solely for the purpose of
providing storage or computer processing services to the subscriber or
customer, then the provider is not authorized to access the contents of
the communications for purposes of providing any services other than
storage or computer processing. 0 8 A government entity can require
disclosure without notice to the subscriber or customer, if the
100. Id. § 2520(c)(1).
101. Id. § 2520(c)(2).
102. Id. § 2701(a)(1) (6).
103. Id. § 2701(a)(2).
104. Id. § 2701(c)(1)- (c)(2).
105. Id. § 2703(a).
106§ 2703(b)(2)(A) (noting that the communication can also be created by means of computer
processing of communications received by means of electronic transmission).
107§ 2711(2) (."[R]emote computing service' means the provision to the public of computer
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system ......
108§ 2703(b)(2).
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governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures
described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or with notice
if the government proceeds via a subpoena or grand jury subpoena, or
under court order. 0 9
b. Civil Damages
Any provider of electronic communication services, subscriber,
or other person aggrieved by a violation of the Stored
Communications Act may bring a civil action if it can show that the
violation was known or intentional. 10 Available relief against any
person or entity, other than the United States, includes preliminary
and other equitable or declaratory relief, damages, punitive damages,
reasonable attorneys' fees, and other reasonably incurred litigation
costs.11' Damages under the Stored Communications Act are the
greater of actual damages and profits earned by the violator or
$1,000.112
5. Examples of litigation under ECPA
In one of the early privacy cases, a plaintiff attempted to sue
DoubleClick, Inc. for violations of the ECPA, CFAA, common law
claims (including trespass to chattels), as well as a violation of New
York's unfair competition laws.' 13 DoubleClick challenged the
propriety of the purported class action and won dismissal of the
case. 114 The basis of the claim was the plaintiffs' assertion that
DoubleClick had placed cookies on users' computers and collected
data that included names, e-mail addresses, home and business
addresses, telephone numbers, searches performed on the Internet,
web pages or sites visited on the Internet, and other communications
and information that users would not ordinarily expect advertisers to
be able to collect.1 15 The plaintiffs alleged that these actions were
taken without their consent and therefore gave rise to liability. I 6
In rejecting the theories advanced by the plaintiffs, the court
noted that the ECPA violation failed for several reasons, including
109§ 2703(b)(1).
110. See generally id. § 2706(a).
11 1§ 2707(b)(1)-(b)(3).
112§ 2707(c).
113. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
114. Id. at497.
115. Id. at 503.
116. Id.
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that DoubleClick's cookies were not temporary, and therefore did not
fall within the statutory definitions of Title II, and that the websites
that generated certain parts of the material were intended for these
websites and those websites authorized DoubleClick's gathering of
the information." 1
7
Another common fact pattern that gives rise to litigation under
ECPA is employee monitoring, and the Quon case provides an
example of the issues in employee monitoring litigation." 18 The Quon
case arose from the monitoring of employee communications on
police department-provided pagers. 19 Two of the four plaintiffs (Jeff
Quon and Steve Trujillo) were both police officers.' 20 One of the
other plaintiffs was a police dispatcher and the fourth was Jeff Quon's
wife. 121 Jeff Quon and Steve Trujillo used department-provided
pagers in the course and scope of their employment, and also
allegedly used them for personal use, including sending sexually-
explicit messages. 22 The department had a "general" policy of
monitoring e-mail and other forms of communications, and also
banned personal use of systems, but the policies were not read to
explicitly cover text messaging.' 23 Notably, Trujillo and Jeff Quon
both signed the "general" policy, and both used the same form of
technology-the department-provided pagers.1
2 4
However, only Jeff Quon attended later meetings, where the
department allegedly stated that text messages were treated like e-
mail and therefore covered by general policy.' 25 There was also
evidence of an informal policy to not monitor texting, which was
evidenced by the fact that personal use was acknowledged and
monitoring was not done unless the employee refused to pay for
"excessive" personal use.12 6
117. Id. at 513 ("To summarize, plaintiffs' GET, POST and GIF submissions are excepted
from §2701(c)(2) because they are 'intended for' the DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites who have
authorized DoubleClick's access."); see also In re Am. Airlines Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d
552 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
118. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
119. Id. at 896.
120. Id. at 895-96.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 898.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 896.
125. See id. at 896.
126. Id. at 897.
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The provider in this case, Arch Wireless, kept a backup copy of
the text messages. 27 Since it paid for the devices, the department was
identified as the "subscriber" under the Stored Communications
Act. 28 Based upon this conclusion, the department obtained copies of
the content contained on the backup copy of the text messages from
the service provider, without employee consent. The four plaintiffs
sued, claiming that the disclosure of the content of communications
violated the Stored Communications Act, their privacy rights, as well
as other statutory protections. 129 The court initially examined the
scope of the Stored Communications Act, and whether Arch Wireless
was a "remote computing service" or an "electronic communication
service," because the answer to that question would impact whether
the content of the communications could just be disclosed to the
recipients, or also to the subscriber without the recipient's consent., 30
The court concluded that Arch Wireless was an electronic computing
service and, as a result, it could not disclose the content of text
messages to a subscriber without consent of a recipient.' 31 Thus, Arch
Wireless' disclosure to the department, the subscriber, according to
the Ninth Circuit, violated the Stored Communications Act, and the
employees' privacy rights.
32
For three of the four plaintiffs, including Trujillo, the Ninth
Circuit simply examined whether the users of text messaging have a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding text messages that are
stored on the service provider's network, ultimately concluding that
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, at least as to the service
provider. 33 This expectation was not endless because the court noted
that one of the recipients could have permitted the department to
review the messages at issue. However, the court clearly stated that,
as a matter of law, the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of
privacy that the messages would not be reviewed absent the consent
of a sender or recipient. Notably, even for Trujillo, who signed the
same policy and used the same technology as Jeff Quon, the court did
not apply the "general" policy. As a result, the ECPA claims were
permitted to proceed.
127. Id. at 902.
128. Id. at900.
129. Id. at 898-99.
130. Id. at900.
131. Id. at903.
132. Id. at 903, 908-09.
133. Id. at 908-09.
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In the case of Jeff Quon, the only plaintiff who attended the
meeting at which it was announced that the "general" policy covered
texting, the Ninth Circuit examined the general policy, noting
The Department's general "Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail
Policy" stated both that the use of computers "for personal benefit
is a significant violation of City of Ontario Policy" and that
"[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality
when using these resources." Quon signed this Policy and attended
a meeting in which it was made clear that the Policy also applied to
use of the pagers. If that were all, this case would be analogous to
the cases relied upon by the Appellees. 1
34
The cases cited by the Appellees and referenced by the court were all
cases in which a policy defeated an employee's right of privacy,
including the case.' 35 Thus, though both Trujillo and Jeff Quon signed
the same policy, it was only applied to Jeff Quon because only he
attended the meeting where the policy was applied to texting.136
However, these were not the only facts considered in the Quon
case. Despite the application of the "general" policy to texting, the
release of the text messages was still held to be improper because of
the "operational reality" regarding texting.137 The operational reality
of the Department was that text messages were not monitored in most
cases, particularly if personal use was paid for, and that many of the
employees were aware of this fact. 138 Thus, despite having a policy on
texting, the employer's failure to consistently implement it proved
fatal and even Jeff Quon was permitted to continue his claim against
Arch Wireless for violation of ECPA.1
39
6. State Wiretap Laws
Forty-nine states have statutory restrictions on wiretapping. All
but 12 of these states closely track the requirements of ECPA, but
there are 12 states that go beyond the federal requirements,
particularly regarding the issue of two-party consent. A good example
of litigation under state wiretap laws is the Kearney case. 14 In
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., the California Supreme Court
134. Id. at 906.
135. Id. at 907-08.
136. Id. at 907
137. Id. at 907-08.
138. Id. at 907.
139. Id. at 907-08.
140. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914 (2006).
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determined the interaction of choice-of-law questions regarding
California's wiretap act.141 Unlike other states, including Georgia,
California does not permit confidential communications to be
recorded without the knowledge of all parties of the
communication. 42 The defendant, a brokerage firm based in Georgia,
was recording telephone calls without informing the other party.
143
This included communications with California consumers. 144
The California Supreme Court concluded that, particularly in
light of California's interest in protecting its residents, under
California's choice-of-law doctrine, California law, not Georgia law,
would control and thus rendered this practice illegal. 145
C. CAN-SPAM
1. Establishing Liability Under CAN-SPAM
CAN-SPAM, like the Do-Not-Call and Do-Not-Fax laws, has
privacy implications, in addition to restricting marketing. CAN-
SPAM almost exclusively regulates emails that are "commercial" or
are "transactional or relationship messages."'' 46 Thus, one of the first
issues in assessing the requirements of CAN-SPAM is to determine
whether an e-mail is a "commercial" e-mail or it is a "transactional or
relationship message."
A commercial e-mail is one that has as its primary purpose
commercial advertisement and/or the promotion of a commercial
product or service. 147
* Facilitates, completes, or confirms a commercial transaction
that the recipient has previously agreed to enter into with the
sender;
* Provides warranty information, product recall information, or
safety or security information with respect to a commercial
product or service used or purchased by the recipient;
* For subscriptions, memberships, accounts, loans, or
comparable ongoing commercial relationships involving the
141. Id. at 918.
142. CAL. PENAL CODE §632 (1999); Kearney, 137 P.3d at 917, 929-30.
143. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 917.
144. Id. at 920.
145. Id. at 937.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1) (2006).
147. Id. § 7702(2)(a).
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ongoing purchase or use by the recipient of products or
services offered by the sender, an e-mail that provides:
(i) Notification concerning a change in the terms or
features;
(ii) Notification of a change in the recipient's standing
or status; or
(iii)At regular periodic intervals, account balance
information or other type of account statement;
* To provide information directly related to an employment
relationship or related benefit plan in which the recipient is
currently involved, participating, or enrolled; or
* To deliver goods or services, including product updates or
upgrades, that the recipient is entitled to receive under the
terms of a transaction that the recipient has previously agreed
to enter into with the sender.
48
While there are limited categories of e-mails that qualify as a
transactional or relationship message, some portions of the law are
read broadly. At least at the pleading stage, one court held that
messages that fall within the exception of being "directly related to an
employment relationship or related benefit plan" do not have to be
sent by the actual employer.
149
There are a number of litigation issues that arise under CAN-
SPAM and state email laws, including whether there is sufficient
"adverse effect" to state a claim, whether there is liability for the
conduct of affiliates, the nature and type of remedies available, and
the scope of CAN-SPAM's preemption of state law.
2. Actual harm Requirement
In order to state a claim under portions of CAN-SPAM, the
electronic mail service provider must show that it was "adversely
affected."' 50 Prior cases, including Hypertouch, held that this
requirement was met when it was shown that high spam traffic caused
148. Id. § 7702(17)(A).
149. Aitken v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 496 F. Supp. 2d 653, 666 (E.D. Va. 2007).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(1) (2006).
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network disruption and increased costs.' 51 This is in contrast to cases
such as Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc. 1
52
In Gordon, the plaintiff alleged he ran an ISP that had standing
to bring a CAN-SPAM claim against the defendants as a "provider of
Internet access service adversely affected by a violation.' ' 53 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff
did not have standing to bring the claim because it did not qualify as
an adversely affected Internet Access Service. 154 As part of its
analysis, the court noted the proliferation of these types of spam
claims, which seek astronomical amounts of statutory damages, where
little or no damage was suffered. 55 The court concluded that while in
this case the plaintiffs might be able to show that they were an
Internet Access Service, they could not show the necessary level of
adverse effect. 156 This argument is frequently made by defendants
against ISPs and typically defendants posit that ISPs must show a
significant effect of a monetary or technical nature, directly caused by
the e-mails at issue. This argument was soundly rejected by the
District Court in the Northern District of California in ASIS Internet
Services vs. Active Response Group.
57
Most courts have found that ISPs, if they show harms that are
unique to them, such as slowed networks and other similar harms, can
state a claim under CAN-SPAM."' In Ferguson, the district court
addressed whether an ISP had suffered sufficient harm to qualify
under CAN-SPAM to state a civil cause of action. 59 The court noted
that in order to be "adversely affected" an ISP had to show some costs
151. See Hypertouch, Inc. v. Kennedy-Western Univ., No. C 04-05203 SI, 2006 WL
648688 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2006).
152. Gordon v. Virttimundo, Inc., No. 06-0204-JCC, 2007 WL 1459395 at *8 (W.D.
Wash. May 15, 2007) (noting the divergence in judicial opinions on the issue where the Gordon
court required more than the mere inconvenience of receiving spain to satisfy the "adversely
affected" requirement under CAN-SPAM).
153. Id. at *l.
154. Id. at *2, *7.
155. Id. at *8.
156. Id.
157. ASIS Internet Serv. et al. v. Active Response Group, No. C07 6211 TEH at 2 (N.D.
Cal. July 30, 2008) (order denying motion to dismiss).
158. See, e.g., Haselton et al. v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. C07-1777RSL at 5-7 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 14, 2008) (order granting motion for partial summary judgment).
159. Ferguson v. Quinstreet, Inc., No. C07-5378RJB, 2008 WL 3166307 at *5-6 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 5, 2008).
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or impact apart from what consumers suffer.' 60 In this unique case,
which did not involve a large commercial ISP, the plaintiff was
unable to show he suffered adverse effect.161 Indeed, in this case, he
did not own a server, but "at best" rented service space. 162 In fact the
court noted that any network harm would likely be borne by his server
company, Sonic.net. 163 He also did not show he had to invest in new
equipment or increase capacity or add new software due to the e-
mails, nor did he show that he had to hire customer service personnel
to deal with complaints.164 At best, he showed that he had to switch
from a dial up connection to a broadband connection, and this impact
was insufficient to meet the adverse effect standard.
165
3. Preemption
CAN-SPAM specifically preempts any state laws or regulations
that expressly regulate the use of e-mail to send commercial
messages. 166 However, state laws that regulate falsity or deception in
e-mails are not preempted. CAN-SPAM does not explicitly affect any
state laws that are not specific to e-mail, including state trespass,
contract, or tort law. Finally, CAN-SPAM does not preempt laws that
relate to acts of fraud or computer crime. However, this does not
mean that CAN-SPAM does not impact these laws in certain ways.
Generally a court will begin any preemption analysis with two
assumptions. First is the presumption that Congress did not intend to
preempt the field of law.1 67 Second, courts presume that the purpose
of Congress is the "ultimate touchstone" in a case. 168 As such,
preemption analysis does not seek to narrowly construe congressional
intent, but rather seeks to fairly read the language, purpose, and
structure of the statute at issue.1
69
One argument many plaintiffs have made is that an inaccuracy in
an e-mail, however slight, renders the e-mail false or misleading, and
160. Id. at *6 (citing Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., No. 06-0204-JCC, 2007 WL 1459395 at
*7 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2007)).
161. Jd. at *2, *6.
162. Id. at *6.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (2006).
167. Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 352 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
168. Id. at 352 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
169. Id. at 352-353 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996)).
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therefore state law would not be preempted by CAN-SPAM in such a
case.1 70 This argument has been directly rejected by federal courts,
because they have interpreted the false or misleading exception to
preemption to require conduct equivalent to fraud.
1 7 1
There are three types of preemption: express, field, and conflict
preemption. "Express preemption occurs when Congress has
considered the issue of preemption, has included in the legislation
under consideration a provision expressly addressing that issue, and
has explicitly provided therein that state law is preempted."'
7 2
When Congress has expressly defined the extent to which state law
is preempted, a court will interpret the effect of the preemption
language by focusing on the plain wording of the provision, but
will narrowly construe the precise language of the preemption
clause in light of the strong presumption against preemption."
Thus, where Congress expressly intended to preempt state law, the
state law is of no effect.
However, there are other forms of preemption that are implicated
by CAN-SPAM: conflict preemption and obstacle preemption. It is
well-settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is "without
effect." 174 Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both federal and state law. 175 Obstacle
preemption occurs when, under the circumstances of a particular case,
the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 76 As
stated by the United States Supreme Court: "[w]hat is a sufficient
obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the
federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended
effects."' 177 Thus, in certain cases, conflicting state e-mail, or other,
laws may be preempted by CAN-SPAM even though the law is not
expressly preempted, particularly if the law in question would stand
170. Id. at 353.
171. Id. at 353-54.
172. Wash. Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 560, 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (citing
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992)).
173. Id. at 567 (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993);
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523).
174. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
175. Viva! Intern. Voice For Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162
P.3d 569, 572 (2007).
176. ld. at 572-73.
177. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
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as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
congressional objectives behind CAN-SPAM.
One area where this issue has been addressed is the preemptive
effect of CAN-SPAM on state university e-mail policies. 17 8 The
university in White Buffalo had adopted certain regulations that
precluded the plaintiff from sending certain e-mails through the
university system. 179 The issue ultimately involved a decision as to
whether the university was acting as a state actor, or as a service
provider. Ultimately the court concluded that while there was
preemption language that supported both sides, the university's
restrictions as a service provider were valid under the Supremacy
Clause. 
180
The District Court in the Central District of California addressed
the level of fraud required to escape CAN-SPAM preemption, holding
that common law fraud, including reliance, was required, and the
mere failure to include a company name in an e-mail would not be
considered a sufficient showing to defeat preemption by alleging
fraud, citing the legislative history of CAN-SPAM and its direction
that states not force e-mails to contain certain content.1
81
D. Federal Do-Not-Call law
1. The Requirements of Do-Not-Call
The federal Do-Not-Call law 182 is generally viewed as one of the
more successful attempts to protect consumer privacy. Though it is
framed in the terms of restrictions on marketing activity, it is truly a
privacy statute that is simply specific to a method of communicating
certain messages. The hallmark of the law is the Do-Not-Call list,'83
an opt-in list on which consumers can place themselves. This act by a
consumer precludes many forms of telephone communications,
particularly those that promote commercial services, unless there is a
pre-existing relationship between the business and the consumer. Do-
178. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 368-69 (5th
Cir. 2005).
179. Id. at 368.
180. Id. at 373-74.
181. Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. CV 07-2406GAFJWJX, 2007 WL
1518650, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
182. 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2008); SERWIN, supra note 14, at 1258.
183. § 310.4(7)(b)(iii)(B) (2008); SERWN, supra note 14, at 1258.
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Not-Call laws also have record retention requirements, as well as
disclosure requirements in many cases.
Many states have followed the federal government's lead and
enacted their own laws, which are in large part driven by the
existence of the Do-Not-Call registry.'8 4 These laws also can contain
restrictions on the use of prerecorded messages, and these restrictions
may not be contained in the same section of the code in which the Do-
Not-Call law was placed.185 Indeed, some states have placed
restrictions on recorded messages and auto-dialers in the Public
Utilities Code.186 It should be noted that certain state laws actually
regulate direct mail and other written solicitations under their Do-
Not-Call laws if the writing attempts to solicit a call. In order to
ensure compliance, a review of applicable state laws is frequently
required. 1
87
It is a violation of the Do-Not-Call law 88 if a telemarketer 189 or a
seller' 90 causes a telemarketer to cause any telephone to ring, or to
engage any person' 91 in telephone conversation, repeatedly or
continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the
called number, or deny or interfere in any way, directly or indirectly,
with a person's right to be placed on any registry of names and/or
telephone numbers of persons who do not wish to receive outbound
telephone calls. 192 It is also improper to initiate an outbound call when
that person previously has stated that he or she does not wish to
receive an outbound telephone call made by or on behalf of the seller
whose goods or services are being offered or made on behalf of the
charitable organization for which a charitable contribution' 93 is being
184. SERWIN, supra note 14, at 1269-81.
185. Id. at 1258.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 6101-08 (2000). This law is also known as the "Telephone Consumer
Protection Act," or "TCPA."
189. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(bb) (2008) ("'Telemarketer' means any person who, in connection
with telemarketing, initiates or receives telephone calls to or from a customer or donor.").
190. Id. § 310.2(z) ("'Seller' means any person who, in connection with a telemarketing
transaction, provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to provide goods or services to the
customer in exchange for consideration.").
191. Id. § 310.2(v) ("'Person' means any individual, group, unincorporated association,
limited or general partnership, corporation, or other business entity.").
192. Id. § 310.2(u) ("'Outbound telephone call' means a telephone call initiated by a
telemarketer to induce the purchase of goods or services or to solicit a charitable contribution.").
193. Id. §310.2(f) ("'Charitable contribution' means any donation or gift of money or any
other thing of value.").
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solicited, or that person's telephone number is on the "do-not-call"
registry, maintained by the Commission, of persons who do not wish
to receive outbound telephone calls to induce the purchase of goods
or services unless the seller:
" has obtained the express agreement, in writing, of such
person to place calls to that person. Such written agreement
shall clearly evidence such person's authorization that calls
made by or on behalf of a specific party may be placed to that
person, and shall include the telephone number to which the
calls may be placed and the signature, including a valid
electronic signature, of that person; or
* has an established business relationship ' 94 with such person,
and that person has not stated that he or she does not wish to
receive outbound telephone calls under the above-referenced
portions of this rule. 195
It is also an illegal act to abandon' 96 an outbound call,' 97 to sell,
rent, lease, purchase, or use any list established to comply with the
Do-Not-Call list for any purpose except compliance with the
provisions of this Rule, or otherwise to prevent telephone calls to
telephone numbers on such lists.'1
98
It is also improper if the seller and/or telemarketer is initiating
any outbound telephone call that delivers a prerecorded message,
other than a prerecorded message permitted for compliance with the
call abandonment safe harbor in § 310.4(b)(4)(iii), unless in any such
call to induce the purchase of any good or service, the seller has
obtained from the recipient of the call an express agreement, in
writing, that:
* the seller obtained only after a clear and conspicuous
disclosure that the purpose of the agreement is to authorize
the seller to place prerecorded calls to such person;
194. Id. § 310.2(n) (establishing business relationship means a relationship between a
seller and a consumer based on: (1) the consumer's purchase, rental, or lease of the seller's
goods or services or a financial transaction between the consumer and seller, within the eighteen
(18) months immediately preceding the date of a telemarketing call; or (2) the consumer's
inquiry or application regarding a product or service offered by the seller, within the three (3)
months immediately preceding the date of a telemarketing call).
195. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A)to (B).
196. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iv) ("[A]n outbound telephone call is 'abandoned' under this section
if a person answers it and the telemarketer does not connect the call to a sales representative
within 2 seconds of the person's completed greeting.")
197. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iv).
198. Id § 310.4(b)(2).
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" the seller obtained without requiring, directly or indirectly,
that the agreement be executed as a condition of purchasing
any good or service;
" evidences the willingness of the recipient of the call to
receive calls that deliver prerecorded messages by or on
behalf of a specific seller; and
* includes such person's telephone number and signature.' 99
Additionally, in any such call to induce the purchase of any good
or service, or to induce a charitable contribution from a member of, or
previous donor to, a non-profit charitable organization on whose
behalf the call is made, the seller or telemarketer also must allow the
telephone to ring for at least 15 seconds or 4 rings before
disconnecting an unanswered call; and within 2 seconds after the
completed greeting of the person called, plays a prerecorded message
that promptly provides the disclosures required by § 310.4(d) or (e),
followed immediately by a disclosure of one or both of the following:
in the case of a call that could be answered in person by a consumer,
that the person called can use an automated interactive voice and/or
keypress-activated opt-out mechanism to assert a Do-Not-Call request
pursuant to § 310.4(b)(l)(iii)(A) at any time during the message.200
The mechanism must automatically add the number called to the
seller's entity-specific Do-Not-Call list, once invoked, immediately
disconnect the call, be available for use at any time during the
message, and in the case of a call that could be answered by an
answering machine or voicemail service, that the person called can
use a toll-free telephone number to assert a Do-Not-Call request
pursuant to § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A).20 1 The number provided must
connect directly to an automated interactive voice or keypress-
activated opt-out mechanism that: automatically adds the number
called to the seller's entity-specific Do-Not-Call list; immediately
thereafter disconnects the call; and is accessible at any time
throughout the duration of the telemarketing campaign.0 2
199. Id. § 310.4(b)(v)(A)(i)-(iv).
200. Id. § 310.4(b)(v)(B)(i)-(ii)(A)(1).
201. Id. § 310.4(b)(v)(B)(i)-(ii)(A)(2)-(3).
202. Id. § 310.4(b)(v)(B)(i)-(ii)(B)(1)-(3).
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2. Federal Do-Not-Call Defenses
It is a defense to any action for a violation of these provisions if
the seller or telemarketer can demonstrate that, as part of the seller's
or telemarketer's routine business practice:
(1) It has established and implemented written procedures to
comply with 16 C.F.R. §§310.4(b)(1)(ii) and (iii);
(2) It has trained its personnel, and any entity assisting in its
compliance, in the procedures established pursuant to 16
C.F.R. §310.4(b)(3)(i);
(3) The seller, or a telemarketer or another person acting on
behalf of the seller or charitable organization, has maintained
and recorded a list of telephone numbers the seller or
charitable organization may not contact, in compliance with
16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A);
(4) The seller or a telemarketer uses a process to prevent
telemarketing 2°3 to any telephone number on any list
established pursuant to 16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(3)(iii) or 16
C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B), employing a version of the "do-
not-call" registry obtained from the Commission no more
than 31 days prior to the date any call is made, and maintains
records documenting this process;
(5) The seller or a telemarketer or another person acting on
behalf of the seller or charitable organization, monitors and
enforces compliance with the procedures established pursuant
to §310.4(b)(3)(i); and
(6) Any subsequent call otherwise violating §310.4(b)(1)(ii) or
(iii) is the result of error.2°
There is similarly no liability for abandoning calls if:
203. Id. § 310.2(cc). Telemarketing means a plan, program, or campaign which is
conducted to induce the purchase of goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one
or more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call. The term does
not include the solicitation of sales through the mailing of a catalog which: contains a written
description or illustration of the goods or services offered for sale; includes the business address
of the seller; includes multiple pages of written material or illustrations; and has been issued not
less frequently than once a year, when the person making the solicitation does not solicit
customers by telephone but only receives calls initiated by customers in response to the catalog
and during those calls takes orders only without further solicitation. For purposes of the previous
sentence, the term "further solicitation" does not include providing the customer with
information about, or attempting to sell, any other item included in the same catalog which
prompted the customer's call or in a substantially similar catalog.
204. Id. § 310.4(b)(3)(i)-(vi).
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* the seller or telemarketer employs technology that ensures
abandonment of no more than 3% of all calls answered by a
person, measured per day per calling campaign, if less than
30 days, or separately over each successive 30-day period or
portion thereof that the campaign continues;
* the seller or telemarketer, for each telemarketing call placed,
allows the telephone to ring for at least 15 seconds or 4 rings
before disconnecting an unanswered call;
* whenever a sales representative is not available to speak with
the person answering the call within 2 seconds after the
person's completed greeting, the seller or telemarketer
promptly plays a recorded message that states the name and
telephone number of the seller on whose behalf the call was
placed; and
* the seller or telemarketer, comply with the record retention
requirements.2 °5
There are also a number of other, additional, restrictions and
requirements contained in the regulations that implement the TCPA.
3. TCPA litigation issues
While certain other sections of the TCPA have been held to
create a private right of action to enforce certain requirements, the
regulations that implement §227(d), including the requirement to have
identifying information, do not give rise to a private right of action, as
does §227(b), or presumably the regulations promulgated under that
* 206
section.
Federal courts have routinely found that jurisdiction for TCPA
claims exist only in state court.20 7 Illinois has also recently held that a
205. Id. § 310.4(b)(4).
206. USA Tax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Office Warehouse Wholesale, LLC, 160 P.3d 428 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2007).
207. See Dun-Rite Constr., Inc. v. Amazing Tickets, Inc., No. 04-3216, 2004 WL
3239533, at *1 (6th Cir. 2004); Murphy v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2000);
Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1288-89 (1 th Cir. 1998); ErieNet, Inc. v.
Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 514 (3d Cir. 1998); Foxhall Realty Law Office, Inc. v.
Telecomms. Premium Servs., Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1998); Hirz v. Travelcomm
Indus., Inc., No. 1:07 CV 01833, 2007 WL 1959293, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (citing; Ari
Weitzner, M.D., P.C. v. Sciton, Inc., No. 05-CV-2533 (SLT)(MDG), 2007 WL 2891521, at *1-2
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining there is no federal court jurisdiction for TCPA claim); Gratt v.
Etourandtravel, Inc., Nos. 06-CV-1965 (FB)(JO), 06-CV-1631(FB)(KAM), 2007 WL 2693903,
at * I (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).
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private right of action exists under the TCPA.2 °8 Moreover, a district
court in Ohio recently concluded that the TCPA did not create
jurisdiction in federal court under federal question jurisprudence.2 °9
4. California "Do Not Call" List
Not to be left out, many states have enacted their own Do-Not-
Call laws. Under California law it is unlawful for any person to do
any of the following: using the "do not call" list for any purpose other
than to comply with this article or applicable federal laws; denying or
interfering in any way, directly or indirectly, with a subscriber's right
to place a California telephone number on the "do not call" list;
causing a subscriber to participate in and be included on the "do not
call" list without the subscriber's knowledge or consent; selling or
leasing the "do not call" list to a person other than a telephone
solicitor; selling or leasing by a telephone solicitor of the "do not call"
list; charging a fee to place a California telephone number on the "do
not call" list; and a telephone solicitor, either directly or indirectly,
persuading a subscriber with whom it has an established business
relationship to place his or her telephone number on the "do not call"
list, if the solicitation has the effect of preventing competitors from
contacting that solicitor's customers.1 °
5. Civil Enforcement
The Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney may
bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction against a
telephone solicitor to enforce the article and to obtain any one or more
of the following remedies: an order to enjoin the violation; a civil
penalty of up to the penalty amount that the Federal Trade
Commission may seek pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1)
of subsection (in) of Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code
as specified in Section 1.98 of Title 16 of the Code of Federal
Regulations; or any other relief that the court deems proper.1
Any person who has received a telephone solicitation that is
prohibited by § 17592, or whose telephone number was used in
violation of § 17591, may bring a civil action in small claims court for
208. First Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Union Fed. Bank of Ind., 872 N.E.2d 84, 85 (II1. App.
Ct. 2007).
209. Hirz v. Travelcomm Indus., Inc., No. 1:07 CV 01833, 2007 WL 1959293, at *1-2
(N.D. Ohio 2007).
210. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17591 (Deering 2007).
211. Id. § 17593(a)(1)-(3).
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an injunction or order to prevent further violations.212 If a person
obtains an injunction or order under this subdivision and service of
the injunction or order is properly effected, a person who thereafter
receives further solicitations in violation of the injunction or order
within 30 days after service of the initial injunction or order, may file
a subsequent action in small claims court seeking enforcement of the
injunction or order and a civil penalty to be awarded to the person in
an amount up to $1,000.213 For purposes of this subdivision, a
person's claims may not be aggregated to establish jurisdiction in a
court other than small claims court.2 14 For purposes of this
subdivision, a defendant is not required to personally appear, but may
appear by affidavit or by written instrument.215 The rights, remedies,
and penalties established by this article are in addition to the rights,
remedies, or penalties established under other laws.216
It is an affirmative defense to any action brought under this
article that the violation was accidental and in violation of the
telephone solicitor's policies and procedures and telemarketer
instruction and training.21 7
6. Nondisclosure of information
Any information regarding any California telephone number
which appears on the "do not call" list in the possession of the
Attorney General, whether obtained from the Federal Trade
Commission or submitted to the Attorney General by a subscriber for
inclusion in the "do not call" list, shall not be disclosed pursuant to a
request made under Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of
Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code and shall also be
privileged under Section 1040 of the Evidence Code.218
Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this section prevents the
Attorney General from providing a certificate stating whether a
specific telephone number was on the "do not call" list that was
effective on the specified date or range of dates in response to: an
inquiry from any law enforcement agency that is investigating,
prosecuting, or responding to an allegation of a violation of this
212. Id. § 17593(b).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. § 17593(c).
217. Id. § 17593(d).
218. Id. § 17594.
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article; or an inquiry from an individual who is investigating or
litigating an alleged violation of this article and who seeks the
certificate regarding his or her telephone number or to an inquiry
from the person who is responding to the allegation.21 9
E. Federal Do-Not-Fax law
Do-Not-Fax laws also exist, and follow a similar model to the
Do-Not-Call laws. Under the federal statute, it is improper to use any
telephone facsimile machine, 2  computer, or other device to send to a
telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited advertisement,2 unless:
(1) the unsolicited advertisement is from a sender with an
established business relationship222 with the recipient;
(2) the sender obtained the number of the telephone facsimile
machine through the voluntary communication of such
number, within the context of such established business
relationship, from the recipient of the unsolicited
advertisement, or a directory, advertisement, or site on the
Internet to which the recipient voluntarily agreed to make
available its facsimile number for public distribution. 3
This restriction does not apply if such a fax is sent based upon an
established business relationship with the recipient that was in
existence before July 9, 2005, if the sender possessed the facsimile
machine number of the recipient before such date of enactment, and
219. Id. § 17594(a)-(b).
220. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) (2006). The term "telephone facsimile machine" means
equipment which has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an
electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe
text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a regular telephone line onto
paper.
221. Id. § 227(a)(5) ("The term 'unsolicited advertisement' means any material advertising
the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to
any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or
otherwise.").
222. Id. § 227(a)(2). The term "established business relationship," for purposes only of
section 1:16 of this chapter, shall have the meaning given the term in section 64.1200 of title 47,
Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on January 1, 2003, except that-(A) such term shall
include a relationship between a person or entity and a business subscriber subject to the same
terms applicable under such section to a relationship between a person or entity and a residential
subscriber; and (B) an established business relationship shall be subject to any time limitation
established pursuant to paragraph (2)(G).
223. Id. § 227 (c)(ii)(l)-(Il).
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the unsolicited advertisement meets the notice requirements identified
below.
224
It should be noted that this exception does not apply when the
consumer has expressly opted-out of receiving such
communications. 5
1. Do-Not-Fax-the established business relationship in the
business context
One argument that was made by plaintiffs in the do-not-fax
context was that the established business relationship exception to the
Do-Not-Fax law did not include businesses.226 This argument has
been rejected, though review of the decision has been granted by the
California Supreme Court.
227
2. Federal Do-Not-Fax law-Opt-outs
Any unsolicited advertisement that is sent via fax must contain a
clear and conspicuous disclosure on the first page of the
advertisement that states that the recipient may request that the sender
of the unsolicited advertisement not send any future unsolicited
advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or machines.22 8 It
must also disclose that the failure to comply, within the shortest
reasonable time, as determined by the FTC, is unlawful. 22 9 The notice
must also contain a domestic contact telephone and facsimile machine
number for the recipient to transmit such a request to the sender and a
cost-free mechanism for a recipient to transmit an opt-out request.
230
The telephone and facsimile machine numbers and the cost-free
mechanism must permit an individual or business to make such a
request at any time on any day of the week.
In order to be effective, the opt-out must identify the telephone
number or numbers of the telephone facsimile machine or machines
to which the request relates, the request must be made to the
224. Id. § 227 (c)(ii)(I1).
225. See id. § 227(c)(iii).
226. Catalyst Strategic Design, Inc. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 55,
57 (2007).
227. See Catalyst Strategic Design, Inc. v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 153 Cal.
App. 4th 1328 (2007).
228. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii) (2006).
229. Id.
230. Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(iv)(l-I).
231. Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(v).
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telephone or facsimile number of the sender of such an unsolicited
advertisement provided above, or by any other method of
communication as determined by the Commission, and the person
making the request has not, subsequent to such request, provided
express invitation or permission to the sender, in writing or otherwise,
to send advertisements to the person at the telephone facsimile
machine.232
A private right of action, including statutory penalties, is
permitted by the law.
F. Lanham Act
In CollegeNet, Inc., the Lanham Act was used by a competitor to
litigate issues regarding online privacy policies. 233 CollegeNet is a
company that provides online college admission application services
to applicants. CollegeNet received payments from colleges for its
services.234
XAP was alleged to be a competitor of CollegeNet who provided
similar services through "Mentor" Websites. 235 XAP allegedly did not
receive payment from the colleges, but rather from certain state
agencies, as well as other commercial institutions, such as banks and
other lending organizations. XAP's website contained a privacy
policy that stated that personal data would not be shared with third-
parties without the user's "express consent and direction. 236 The
privacy policy also stated that "[t]he information you enter will be
kept private in accordance with your express consent and
direction. 237
Certain XAP web pages asked an opt-in question of the
applicants, which was, in essence, were they interested in receiving
information about student loans or financial aid.238 If a customer
answered yes, their information was provided to the lending
institutions that were the defendant's paying customers.239 There was
allegedly no express disclosure that by answering yes to this question
information would be shared with third-parties.
232. Id. § 227(b)(2)(E)(ii-iii).
233. Collegenet, Inc. v. XAP Corp., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. Or. 2006).
234. Collegenet, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
235. Id. at 1072.
236. Id. at 1074.
237. Id. at 1077.
238. Id. at 1072.
239. Id. at 1072-73.
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CollegeNet asserted that XAP had engaged in unfair competition
under the Lanham Act by falsely representing its privacy policy to
consumers, and moved for summary judgment on its claims of unfair
competition. 40 XAP disputed this and also moved for summary
judgment.241 XAP first argued that these statements were merely
incidental, and not fundamental, to its products and services and
therefore not actionable.242 The court rejected this argument, finding
that Internet privacy promises are not "minor matters. 2 43 While the
court did not determine that the statements were "literally untrue," the
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to permit the claim
to proceed past the summary judgment and go to trial on this, and
other issues.2 44 The court also found that there was sufficient evidence
to deny summary judgment on the grounds that the statements were
potentially material to the defendant's customers, notably not the
consumers, but rather the financial institutions that paid the
defendant.245
G. California Law-Business and Professions Code § 17200
State unfair competition laws in many cases mirror the FTC Act,
and California's law246 has been brought more in line with the FTC
Act. California's statute proscribes unfair competition and deceptive
acts or practices, as well as false advertising.247 The California
Attorney General, certain county attorneys, and private citizens all
can bring claims under Section 17200.248 Representative actions are
also permitted under this law, although this has been dramatically
reduced.249 Now the lead plaintiff must allege actual injury,25° which
in these cases, as noted below, can be difficult.
A 17200 claim is commonly made by plaintiffs and the cause of
action has been included in privacy related litigation.25' Moreover, as
240. Id. at 1074.
241. Id. at 1075.
242. Id. at 1077.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1079-80.
246. CAL Bus. & PROF CODE § 17200 (Deering 2007).
247. Id.
248. Id. § 17203.
249. Id. § 17204.
250. Id. § 17204.
251. Party City Corp. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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unfair competition claims, such as the claim made in CollegeNet, Inc.,
become more common, 17200 may become a central claim in
plaintiffs' privacy litigation. The UCL's statutory origins are
California's codification of nuisance laws. 2  As the federal
government increasingly regulated corporate conduct via statutes
administered by the FTC, California similarly increased the UCL's
25
scope. Primarily due to a series of statutory amendments that
occurred in the 1990's, the UCL expanded far beyond the FTC Act,
though recent amendments have somewhat restricted its scope.254
The UCL regulates five forms of conduct: unlawful; unfair, or
fraudulent business practices; unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising; and any act prohibited under Business and Professions
Code Sections 17500-17577.5.255 While these categories might, at
first blush, appear to be quite narrow, in reality the UCL has a broad
sweep and has been utilized in numerous contexts. Indeed, the UCL's
breadth and impact are apparent from its use in a wide variety of
cases, ranging from individuals seeking redress for the alleged
improper payment of rather insignificant account fees, 256 to a
consumer group bringing an action to stop the alleged sale of
257cigarettes to minors, to a competitor seeking disgorgement of
profits wrongfully obtained by another competitor, amounting to
approximately $30 million.258
One of the most complex issues facing defendants in UCL
claims is the scope of relief available to a plaintiff.259 Section 17203 is
the only statutory provision that provides guidance on the issue of
available remedies under the UCL.26 ° Under this provision, any
252. ANDREW SERWIN, INTERNET MARKETING LAW HANDBOOK § 2:2 (West 2007).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. CAL Bus. & PROF CODE § 17200 (2007); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 249
(2002).
256. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 791 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989).
257. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1998).
258. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937 (Cal. 2003).
259. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17203, 17535 (Deering 2007).
260. See generally id §§ 17500 et seq. (However, the false advertising law (sections
17500, et seq.), which is expressly incorporated into the UCL, provides its own set of civil and
criminal remedies.); See also id. §§ 17203 and 17534.5 (These remedies include criminal
penalties, injunctive relief, civil penalties, attorneys' fees, and restitution.); People v. Bestline
Prods., Inc., 132 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795-96 (1976) (explaining that, as with the remedies available
under the UCL, the remedies under the false advertising law are cumulative to other remedies
provided by state law).
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person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair
competition may be enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 17203 states that:
[a]ny person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in
unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments,
including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to
prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice
which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or
as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money
or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by•.. 261
means of such unfair competition.
Section 17203 has been interpreted as giving courts broad remedial
powers in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute.262 Thus,
courts have utilized their authority to design appropriate relief in a
variety of circumstances.
263
A court can grant injunctive relief as well as other forms of
equitable relief, including appointing a receiver.2 4 Courts are also
authorized to "restore" to any person any money or property which
was acquired by unfair competition. In other words, the equitable
remedy of restitution 265 is expressly permitted. Finally, civil penalties
are authorized in certain circumstances under Section 17203.266
However, courts have held that restitution does not equate to
other more traditional forms of compensatory, or monetary, damages
that are available in other claims. These damages include lost profits
and other forms of relief to compensate the plaintiff for harms it
suffered and to restore equity. 67 Several federal courts interpreted the
language of Section 17203 as precluding the recovery of damages.
268
261. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (Deering 2007).
262. Accord, Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 709 (2000)
(discussing the court's sweeping powers to create appropriate relief).
263. See, e.g., Comm. on Children's Television, 673 P.2d 660 (1983); People v. Superior
Court, 507 P.2d 1400 (1973); Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Assn., 496 P.2d 817 (1972)
(granting injunctive relief).
264. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (Deering 2007).
265. Restitution is a remedy that permits a plaintiff to recover funds from a defendant
where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant obtained money or property that belonged
to the plaintiff. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 948 (Cal. 2003).
266. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (Deering 2007).
267. See Merlo v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 130 Cal. Rptr 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
268. See Cacique, Inc. v. Robert Reiser & Co., 169 F.3d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 1999)
(disallowing use of UCL in trade secrets case to recover royalties); see also Xerox Corp. v.
Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1550 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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The California Supreme Court ended this debate in 1992 when it held
that damages are not available under the UCL.269
The California Supreme Court has now held that only restitution,
and not disgorgement, is available as a remedy under the unfair
competition law. 270 Thus, as a condition to recovery of restitution, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant gained funds directly from the
plaintiff, and not profits that came from a third-party.27 '
H. California law-Civil Code § 1747.08
California, as part of its credit card laws, has restricted the
collection of certain information in connection with a credit card
transaction and this law has been a common basis of privacy
litigation, including class actions in California.
Except as otherwise provided, no person, firm, partnership,
association, or corporation that accepts credit cards for the transaction
of business shall do any of the following: request, or require as a
condition to accepting the credit card as payment in full or in part for
goods or services, the cardholder to write any personal identification
information 272 upon the credit card transaction form or otherwise;
request, or require as a condition to accepting the credit card as
payment in full or in part for goods or services, the cardholder to
provide personal identification information, which the person, firm,
partnership, association, or corporation accepting the credit card
writes, causes to be written, or otherwise records upon the credit card
transaction form or otherwise; or utilize, in any credit card
transaction, a credit card form which contains preprinted spaces
269. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992).
270. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 709 (2000) (holding that a
court may not disgorge all of defendant's profits, but may only order restitution to individuals
who have lost money or property as a result of defendant's wrongful conduct).
271. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 937-38 (Cal. 2003). In
Korea Supply, the plaintiff, an arm's broker, was hired to promote a bid to the Republic of
Korea. The contract was awarded to a competitor, Lockheed Martin. The plaintiff argued that
the contract was procured by improper means. The appellate court agreed stating that the profits
earned by defendant by improper means could be recovered by plaintiff, where plaintiff would
have otherwise obtained these profits.
272. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (Deering 2007) ("For purposes of this section 'personal
identification information,' means information concerning the cardholder, other than
information set forth on the credit card, and including, but not limited to, the cardholder's
address and telephone number.").
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specifically designated for filling in any personal identification
information of the cardholder.273
These restrictions do not apply: if the credit card is being used as
a deposit to secure payment in the event of default, loss, damage, or
other similar occurrence; to cash advance transactions; if the person,
firm, partnership, association, or corporation accepting the credit card
is contractually obligated to provide personal identification
information in order to complete the credit card transaction or is
obligated to collect and record the personal identification information
by federal law or regulation; or if personal identification information
is required for a special purpose incidental but related to the
individual credit card transaction, including, but not limited to,
information relating to shipping, delivery, servicing, or installation of
the purchased merchandise, or for special orders.
274
This law does not prohibit any person, firm, partnership,
association, or corporation from requiring the cardholder, as a
condition to accepting the credit card as payment in full or in part for
goods or services, to provide reasonable forms of positive
identification, which may include a driver's license or a California
state identification card, or where one of these is not available,
another form of photo identification, provided that none of the
information contained thereon is written or recorded on the credit card
transaction form or otherwise.275 If the cardholder pays for the
transaction with a credit card number and does not make the credit
card available upon request to verify the number, the cardholder's
driver's license number or identification card number may be
recorded on the credit card transaction form or otherwise.276
1. Civil Enforcement
Any person who violates this law is subject to a civil penalty not
to exceed $250 for the first violation and $1,000 for each subsequent
violation, to be assessed and collected in a civil action brought by the
person paying with a credit card, by the Attorney General, or by the
district attorney or city attorney of the county or city in which the
violation occurred. 277 However, no civil penalty may be assessed for a
273. Id. § 1747.08(a)(1)-(3).
274. Id. § 1747.08(c)(1)-(4).
275. Id. § 1747.08(d).
276. Id. § 1747.08(d).
277. Id. § 1747.08(e).
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violation of this section if the defendant shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a
bona fide error made notwithstanding the defendant's maintenance of
procedures reasonably adopted to avoid that error.27 8 When collected,
the civil penalty shall be payable, as appropriate, to the person paying
with a credit card who brought the action, or to the general fund of
whichever governmental entity brought the action to assess the civil
penalty.279
The Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney
within his or her respective jurisdiction, may bring an action in the
superior court in the name of the people of the State of California to
enjoin violation of these restrictions and, upon notice to the defendant
of not less than 5 days, to temporarily restrain and enjoin the
violation.280 If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the
defendant violated these restrictions, the court may issue an injunction
restraining further violations, without requiring proof that any person
has been damaged by the violation.2 1 In these proceedings, if the
court finds that the defendant has violated these restrictions, the court
may direct the defendant to pay any or all costs incurred by the
Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney in seeking or
obtaining injunctive relief pursuant to this subdivision.2 2
2. Zip codes and § 1747.08
One argument plaintiffs have made is that a zip code is personal
identification information under the definition of this statute.28 3 In a
recent case the Appellate Court concluded that a zip code is not itself
specific or personal information about an individual, but rather it
serves as a group identifier about location, and was therefore not
personal identification information under this law, holding that
"Plaintiff is painting with too broad a brush to state that under the
Act, any component of an address is necessarily a 'personal
identification' item, since the zip code portion of a:i address does not
in itself supply enough information to identify an individual. 284
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. § 1747.08(f).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Party City Corp. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
284. Id. at 737.
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3. Other litigation issues under § 1747.08
Plaintiffs have attempted to expand the amount of litigation
under this law to include Internet transactions, and returns of
merchandise and these efforts have been thwarted.285
I. Privacy litigation-Electronic conversion
New York, among other states, has now recognized a conversion
claim for electronic data.286 Certain other courts have permitted
trespass to chattels claims to be stated based upon improper pop-up
advertising.287 Other courts have rejected a finding that electronic data
can serve as the basis of a conversion claim.288
V. DAMAGES IN PRIVACY LITIGATION
Private plaintiffs, where their claims rely upon statutes or
theories that do not include statutory damages, have faced dismissal
of their claims in many cases because they either lack standing to
bring their claim, or cannot prove that compensable damages resulted
from the alleged privacy breach. In Trikas, one of the first of such
cases, the court rejected a plaintiffs claim for violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.2 89 The plaintiff brought an action based upon
the assertion that an account erroneously remained open on his credit
report, 29 claiming that he had suffered emotional distress because of
this, even though it was admitted that no creditor actually saw or
relied upon the erroneous information.29'
285. Saulic v. Symantec Corp., 8:07-cv-00610-AHS-PLA, 2009 WL 281479, (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 5, 2009)
(Internet sales not subject to act); Kom v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., No. CIV. S-07-02745 FCD
JFM. 2008 WL 2225743 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2008) (returns not subject to act); TJX Cos., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 77 Cal. Rptr. 114, 118-120 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Absher v. AutoZone, Inc., 78
Cal. Rptr. 3d 817, 821 (Cal. Ct. App.2008); Romeo v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 06CV1505
IEG, 2007 WL 3047105 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007).
286. Thyroffv. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 493 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
287. Burgess v. Am. Express Co., No. 07CVS 40, 2007 WL 2568893, at *2 (N.C. May 21,
2007).
288. In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Mass. 2007), affid
in part, 2009 WL 806891 (1st Cir. March 30, 2009).
289. Trikas v. Universal Card Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 37, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
290. Id. at 39.
291. Id. at 45 ("Here too, however, Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of
damages to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff testified that he was never turned down for any
credit because of the Bank's actions, and that he never even applied for any credit during the
time his account remained erroneously open. Plaintiff admits that he has not suffered monetary
damages: 'It's not a value that I suffered monetarily, as you could say it, a dollar value, because
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There have been several recent cases that have addressed the
issue of whether the breach of a privacy policy can support litigation
against a party that did not comply with its own policy. Courts have
concluded that the mere breach of a privacy policy may not be
sufficient to establish a claim for damages. In Dyer,292 a group of
plaintiffs sued Northwest Airlines for allegedly disclosing personal
information gathered via the Web to certain government agencies in
direct violation of Northwest's posted privacy policy. 293 Northwest
advanced two theories to defeat the plaintiffs' claims. First, it argued
that its online policy was not a contract, but rather an aspirational
policy, the violation of which did not give rise to contractual
liability.294 Second, Northwest Airlines argued that even assuming its
act was a breach of contract, the plaintiffs could not show any damage
that resulted from the disclosure.295 The court accepted both
arguments and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, finding that there was
no breach of contract for several reasons, including a lack of
damages.296
In Stollenwerk,297 the Arizona district court addressed issues
related to causation and the speculative nature of damages arising out
of privacy breaches, even where indisputably certain identity theft
issues had occurred. Tri-West maintained personal information
regarding a number of current and former members of the U.S.
Military, as well as their dependents, and had experienced security
breaches where unauthorized personnel entered their facilities. 298 The
plaintiffs alleged that despite this event, another breach occurred
when hard drives, containing plaintiffs' personal information, were
stolen from the same facility. 299 One of the plaintiffs had six credit
accounts opened under his name.3°0 Some of the plaintiffs did not
suffer identity theft, but they incurred costs in connection with
this is, like I said, it's emotional, it's stress, it's burden."'). For a complete discussion of these
concepts and privacy litigation, see generally SERWIN, supra note 14, at 354-407.
292. Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004).
293. Id. at 1197.
294. Id. at 1199.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1120, see also In re Am. Airlines Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552 (N.D.
Tex. 2005).
297. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, 2005 WL 2465906 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6,
2005).
298. Id. at *1.
299. Id. at * 1-2.
300. Id. at*1.
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obtaining certain reports regarding their credit, as well as identity
theft insurance.
30 1
While the court noted that identity theft issues could frequently
result in damages other than purely pecuniary damages, this was
insufficient to state a claim for negligence, even though psychological
or emotional distress, inconvenience and harm to credit rating or
reputation could occur. 30 2 The plaintiffs attempted to avoid dismissal
by arguing that privacy breach cases were akin to toxic torts since a
privacy breach, in the plaintiffs' mind, could lead to increased chance
of identity theft. Since toxic tort cases in certain instances find that
medical monitoring costs can be damage, the plaintiffs argued that
their claims should not be dismissed.30 3 The court soundly rejected
this argument 304 by deciding that even though one of the plaintiffs had
experienced credit issues, the court held that there was insufficient
evidence showing that it was caused by the theft of hard drives and
dismissed his claim as well.305
The Ninth Circuit reviewed this decision and, in an unpublished
opinion, modified the analysis. While it still upheld the dismissal of
two of the three plaintiffs' claims, and completely rejected the
medical monitoring analogy, it reversed the judgment in favor of the
third plaintiff, finding that given the unique factual circumstances
there could be potential damages that flowed from the alleged
disclosure of information.30 6 It therefore reversed in part, affirmed in
part, and remanded the case.307
The court in Forbes reached a similar conclusion. 30 8 In this case,
the plaintiffs' personal information was obtained through a theft of
computers that contained unencrypted customer information including
names, addresses, social security numbers and account numbers.30 9
Again, it was undisputed that plaintiffs had expended time and money
to monitor credit, but there was no indication that the information had
301. Id. at * 1.
302. Id. at *4.
303. Id. at *2.
304. Id. at *4 ("The Court must acknowledge the important distinction between toxic tort
and products liability cases, which necessarily and directly involve human health and safety, and
credit monitoring cases, which do not.") (citations omitted).
305. Id. at *7.
306. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance, No. 05-16990, 254 Fed. Appx. 664,
665-68, (9th Cir. 2007).
307. Id. at 665.
308. Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp.2d 1018, 1020-21 (D. Minn. 2006).
309. Id. at 1019.
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been accessed or misused. ° Consistent with the other decisions cited
above, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they had suffered
damage as a result of the time and money they had spent to monitor
their credit, because the plaintiffs could not prove a loss of earning
capacity or wages. 3 11 The court therefore rejected both the breach of
contract and negligence claims.
Similar conclusions have been reached by other courts, including
in the DSW matter.3 12 Recently, in Kahle, an Ohio court followed the
DSW decision by finding that economic harm was a prerequisite for a
plaintiff to state a claim for damages.31 3 Kahle concerned a security
breach that could have resulted in the disclosure of the plaintiffs
personal information.314  The defendant advised all affected
individuals to place a credit freeze on their report.315 The plaintiff
could not establish any direct damages, other than costs associated
with a credit monitoring service that the plaintiff purchased.31 6 The
court dismissed the claim, holding that any alleged damages were too
speculative, particularly since the defendant had advised the plaintiff
to place a security freeze on her credit report.31 7 The court dismissed
the claim despite the fact that the plaintiff was seeking reimbursement
of monies paid for a credit monitoring service. In addition to this case,
courts are still routinely finding that damages resulting from future
identity theft are too speculative to be the basis of a successful civil
claim.31t The lack of damages issue has also been addressed in the
context of FCRA, at least for claims of actual damages. 3 9 FCRA
does, however, permit recovery of statutory damages for willful
310. Id. at 1019-20.
311. Id. at 4; see also Cox v. Chicago Great W. R. Co., 223 N.W. 675,677 (Minn. 1929).
312. Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688-69, 66 (S.D. Ohio 2006) ("Therefore,
because the specific factual allegations of the Amended Complaint do not allege that the
Plaintiff has personally experienced any injury other than 'hav[ing] been subjected to a
substantial increased risk of identity theft or other related financial crimes,' the Court must
accept the specific allegations Plaintiff makes as a true representation of the injury that the
Plaintiffhas suffered.") (citing Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2002)).
313. Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709-10 (S.D. Ohio, 2007).
314. Id. at 706.
315. Id. at707.
316. Id. at 709.
317. Id. at 712-13.
318. See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2007)
(dismissing claim for future identity theft arising from the theft of a laptop computer).
319. Schroeder v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 2006 WL 2009053 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (granting
sumnary judgment, in part, and dismissing portion of claim under FCRA because plaintiff
failed to evidence of actual injury).
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violations, and claims without damages can, sometimes, survive. 3 20
This was also the conclusion in cases involving American Airlines
and JetBlue.321
VI. STANDING IN PRIVACY LITIGATION
Standing is a related issue to damages, though some courts
continue to reach conclusions regarding standing that are inconsistent
with their findings of no actual damages. Standing is a constitutional
issue under Article III, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing the following three elements: that it
has suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally-protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
the result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court; and that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.322
Article III's requirements are not "mere" pleading formalities.
They are "rather an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case, [and]
each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation., 32 3 Irrespective of other laws to the contrary, Article III
standing is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing and
a "threshold issue" to be addressed before a federal court "proceeds at
all in any cause. 324 Because it is a jurisdictional issue, Article III
standing can be challenged at any point in the case or raised sua
320. Id. at *5 (citing Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952-53 (7th Cir.
2006)).
321. In re Am. Airlines, Inc. Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567 (N.D. Tex. 2005); In
re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litigat., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 326-27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding loss of privacy is not a recoverable damage under a breach of contract theory).
322. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
323. See id. at 561.
324. See id. at 560; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998);
Gerlinger v. Amazon.com, 526 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 2008); Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans
of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Lanham Act prudential standing cannot
be addressed so long as Article III standing remains in doubt because constitutional standing is a
threshold issue that we should address before examining the issues of prudential standing")
(citing Joint Stock Society v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001)).
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sponte by federal courts.32 5 It is against this backdrop that cases
regarding standing must be viewed.
In Bell v. Acxiom, the court addressed the issue of damages in a
privacy case arising out of a computer hacking incident and the
plaintiffs lack of standing was an issue raised by the defendant. The
plaintiff alleged that the hacking incident compromised her personally
identifiable information and that "lax security" left her at risk for
privacy issues, as well as receiving junk mail.326 The main issue
addressed was whether the plaintiff had standing to pursue the claim.
In this case, because the plaintiff could not show injury, or even that
she received any junk mail, the court dismissed her case because she
lacked standing.
327
A court recently reaffirmed the principle that damage did not
occur, and therefore no standing existed, at the time of a data theft in
the absence of evidence of harm.328 The court distinguished cases
from Ohio that did find harm at the moment of disclosure when the
disclosure involved medical information.329 It also distinguished cases
325. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones 177 U.S. 449,
453 (1900)).
326. Bell v. Acxiom, 2006 WL 2850042 at *1 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
327. Id. at *2 (stating that even if plaintiff had shown that she received junk mail, it is
unlikely whether this would have been sufficient showing of injury). In this case, Plaintiff
alleged that she suffered an increased risk of both receiving unsolicited mailing advertisements
and of identity theft. In response, Defendant argues that both Plaintiff's alleged injuries are
speculative--Plaintiff has not plead that she has received a single marketing mailer or had her
identity stolen. Moreover, several courts have held that the receipt of unsolicited and unwanted
mail does not constitute actual harm. Additionally, while there have been several lawsuits
alleging an increased risk of identity theft, no court has considered the risk itself to be damage.
Only where the plaintiff has actually suffered identity theft has the court found that there were
damages. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not know whether her name and information were
contained within the databases stolen by Levine. More than three years after the theft, Plaintiff
has not alleged that she has suffered anything greater than an increased risk of identity theft.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged that she has suffered any concrete damages, she does not have
standing under the case or controversy requirement.
See also, Walters v. DHL Exp., 2006 WL 1314132 *1,*5 (C.D. 11. 2006) (dismissing case based
upon damage claim for increased risk of identity theft); Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA,
741 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (receipt of unsolicited advertisements did not
constitute actual harm); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339-40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)
(the "right of privacy does not extend to the mailbox"); c.f Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816
A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003) (damages existed when private investigator sold information to an
individual who was stalking a person that he ultimately killed because the court concluded that
the private investigator, in these circumstances, had a duty not to subject a third party to an
increased risk of criminal misconduct).
328. Levine v. DSW, Inc., Court of Common Pleas, State of Ohio, County of Cuyhoga,
Civil Case No. 586371 (2008).
329. Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 75 N.E.2d 518, 523-24 (Ohio 1999).
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involving the disclosure by the government of Social Security
numbers.330
In the Pichler, case the Third Circuit considered whether the
DPPA applied to union activities, but more importantly addressed
standing in privacy litigation.331 In this case a union gathered license
plates at a company and then bought information related to the license
plates in an effort to identify targets for unionizing activity. 332 Within
the plaintiff group were spouses of the registered owners of vehicles
and the non-owner spouses' information was revealed within the
searches. 333 The court held that since the spouses were not registered
owners (and therefore not identified in the records) of automobiles
they lacked standing to bring a claim under the DPPA.334 The court
rejected the argument that these plaintiffs had standing because they
shared an address with individuals covered by the DPPA.335
Despite these holdings, and the clear mandate of Lujan, some
courts have found that plaintiffs have Article III standing in data loss
cases, despite an often concurrent finding that the plaintiff cannot
prove damage.336 Pisciotta involved allegations of data loss and the
Seventh Circuit, though it recognized many courts reached a different
conclusion, first ruled that the allegations of data loss were sufficient
to establish standing to assert negligence and breach of contract
cases. 337 It then, dismissed the plaintiffs' case, finding that the
plaintiffs could not establish damages, a required element of its
330. State ex rel. Office of Montgomery County Pub. Defender v. Siroki, 842 N.E.2d 508,
511-12 (Ohio 2006); Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. City of Akron, 640 N.E.2d 164, 169 (Ohio
1994).
331. Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 2008).
332. Id. at 384.
333. Id.
334. Holding that in order to meet the standing requirement the plaintiff must show three
things. "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not the result of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 390-91
(citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quotation marks, footnote,
and citations omitted)).
335. Id. at 391-392.
336. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
337. Id. at 634.
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negligence and breach of contract claims, and therefore dismissed the
case.
338
This case was applied by the Southern District of New York in
another loss data case resulting from the theft of computers. 339 As in
Pisciotta, the District Court in Caudle found that allegations of lost
data in this case were sufficient to meet the plaintiffs standing
burden.34° Pisciotta was also recently followed in this case arising
from an alleged security breach involving the Gap.341 In this case, the
plaintiff alleged that the Gap, via a third-party, had lost data regarding
a class of individuals due to a laptop computer theft.342 The District
Court examined whether the plaintiff had standing, finding that the
plaintiff had met his burden. The court then examined whether the
plaintiff could state a claim against the Gap, finding that the plaintiff
could not state a breach of contract or negligence claim. "While Ruiz
has standing to sue based upon his increased risk of future identity
theft, this risk does not rise to the level of appreciable harm necessary
to assert a negligence claim under California law."
343
These holdings highlight the fact that Article III standing does
not exist since the courts inconsistently find that plaintiffs have met
their burden under standing, but fail as a matter of law to meet their
evidentiary burden to state a claim. Indeed, the clear mandate of
Lujan requires he plaintiff meet his burden of proof "with the manner
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.",344 Since these courts are simultaneously finding sufficient
injury exists for Article III, but also finding the plaintiffs have failed
to meet their burden of proof to establish a claim, the analysis of the
Bell v. Acxiom line of cases appears to be more consistent with Lujan.
VII.IMMUNITY IN LITIGATION-THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY
ACT
The Communications Decency Act offers some level of
immunity to defendants that face privacy litigation, though most of
the litigation regarding the CDA has taken place regarding other
338. Id. at 636-40.
339. See, e.g., Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)
340. Id. at 280.
341. Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 2009 WL 941162 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
342. Id. at *1.
343. Id. at *4.
344. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
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issues. The goal of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) was
to promote the growth of the Internet, to encourage restrictions on
improper content and, at the same time, limit the liability of ISPs for
publishing statements that were authored by third-parties.346 One of
the underlying themes of laws regarding the Internet, as well as the
cases interpreting them, is that the Internet was so delicate that it
could be destroyed by the heavy-handed regulation of legislatures and
courts. This thinking underlies the CDA, the Internet tax debate, as
well as many other issues. Now, from the Ninth Circuit, we see the
first decision that questions this underlying theory, and instead posits
a theory that online commerce should not gain certain benefits over
offline activity.
347
The CDA was passed by Congress in response to a particular
case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., which held an
Internet Service Provider liable for defamation due to messages
placed upon a message board it ran.348 The basis of that court's ruling
was that Prodigy exercised editorial control over the messages
because it selectively deleted certain messages, and not others.349 The
Ninth Circuit recently summarized the purpose of the CDA as
follows:
In passing section 230, Congress sought to spare interactive
computer services this grim choice by allowing them to perform some
editing on user-generated content without thereby becoming liable for
all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn't edit or
delete. In other words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of
user-generated content, not the creation of content:
[S]ection [230] provides 'Good Samaritan' protections from civil
liability for providers.., of an interactive computer service for
345. 47 U.S.C. § 230(2006).
346. H.R. Rep. No.104-458 at 188-189 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 10.
347. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1164-65 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The dissent stresses the importance of the Internet to
modem life and commerce, Dissent at 1176, and we, of course, agree: The Internet is no longer
a fragile new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by
overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses.
Rather, it has become a dominant-perhaps the preeminent-means through which commerce is
conducted. And its vast reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to
exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an
unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general
applicability.").
348. Id. at 1163.
349. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995).
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actions to restrict ... access to objectionable online material. One
of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-
Oakmont [sic] v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which
have treated such providers ... as publishers or speakers of content
that is not their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material.35 °
The CDA impacts Internet privacy and security issues in two
ways. First, it can impact the liability of an ISP related to postings of
information and statements regarding other persons or entities.
Second, given its restrictions upon liability, as well as the anonymous
status of many posters on blogs, chat rooms or bulletin boards, many
companies or individuals that are defamed or otherwise harmed will
typically sue the anonymous posters and subpoena their identity from
the ISP.
The CDA is also frequently addressed in spyware and phishing
cases where software companies gather information and block
programs.35 1 Indeed, a software company that gathered a list of sites
that appeared to be phishing sites was immune under the CDA
because it gathered the information from a third-party.
352
A. Communications Decency Act-Restrictions Upon Liability
In defamation actions one of the key issues is whether a person is
a publisher or speaker of information. The CDA provides that neither
providers nor users of an interactive computer service 353 will be
treated as a publisher or speaker of information that is provided by
another information content provider, which therefore eliminates
liability.35 4 The CDA also eliminates liability for any provider or user
of an interactive computer service related to:
(1) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers
350. Fair Housing Council, 521 F.3d at 1157 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996)).
351. Associated Bank-Corp. v. Earthlink, Inc., 2005 WL 2240952, at *3 (W.D. Wis.
2005).
352. Id.
353. "Interactive computer service" means any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 47 U.S.C.
§230(0(2) (2006).
354. Id. § 230(c)(1). "Information content provider" means any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. Id. § 230(0(3).
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to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(2) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described above.
355
The CDA appears to apply immunity beyond the mere
publication of information. Certain courts have held that the CDA
also gives immunity for service providers even where they have taken
on "a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content." 356 The CDA
does not, however, provide immunity for a service provider where the
service provider contributes to the content. The First Circuit
addressed the scope of CDA immunity and held, as have other Circuit
Courts, that the immunity will apply to sites, even where the
construction and operation .of the site have some influence on the
content that is posted.357 Indeed, in one case a website that provided
multiple-choice questions and a series of essay questions that shaped
the eventual content was found to fall within the CDA's grant of
immunity, even for claims of invasion of privacy.
3 58
One Ohio federal court recently addressed the scope of CDA
immunity with state law claims and found that it applied broadly and
barred a number of common law claims.359 However, another court
recently held that allegations by the FTC that the sale of pretexted
phone records violated the FTC Act were not barred by the CDA
because these claims did not seek to treat the defendant as a publisher
under the CDA.36°
The CDA has also been applied to the online dating service
context and the court addressed whether there was immunity for a
355. Id. § 230(c)(2).
356. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002),
affd on other grounds, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998) (service provider's retention of editorial right, even if not
exercised, did not preclude CDA immunity); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
357. Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007).
358. Carafano, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
359. These included: breach of contract; fraud; negligent infliction of emotional distress;
negligent misrepresentation; breach of warranty; violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
Act; and failure to warn. Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 724, 728 (N.D. Ohio
2007).
360. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 2007 WL 4356786 at *5 (D. Wyo. 2007).
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website that allegedly sent false dating profiles, and continued to send
profiles of members that were no longer part of the website.361
B. Immunity for the Conduct of Affiliates
Courts have also applied the CDA immunity to service providers
that merely provide Internet connections to the web where the ISPs
service is used to send e-mails, even where the e-mails are offensive,
illegal, or where they are sent by affiliates.36 2 In Beyond Systems, the
plaintiff alleged it received a number of unsolicited and deceptive e-
mails regarding certain websites that were allegedly affiliates of the
defendants.363 Notably, the content itself was not created by the
defendants.364 The court examined the conduct of Rackspace, a
defendant that provided hosting and web services, and concluded that,
as an "interactive computer service provider," it could not be held
liable under Maryland's anti-spain law, due to the CDA.36 5
C. Immunity for Conduct of Users
Another issue that courts have addressed is the liability of
websites for user-generated content. Roommates.com is a website that
attempts to match potential roommates up in an online forum based
upon certain preferences. Roommates.com did two key things as part
of the registration process to use its site, in addition to asking general
background questions: (1) it provided a structure through a series of
mandatory questions regarding sex, sexual orientation, and whether
they will bring children; and (2) provided an open-ended "Additional
Comments" section.36 6 A variety of Fair Housing Councils in
California brought a lawsuit seeking to hold Roommates.com liable
for asking these questions and thereby inducing its users to violate
Fair Housing laws.36 7 Roommates.com believed it was immune from
liability due to the CDA because it did not create the content, but
instead only displayed the responses of its users.368
361. Anthony v. Yahoo!, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
362. Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536 (D. Md. 2006).
363. Id. at 528.
364. Id. at 529.
365. Id. at 537.
366. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
367. ld. at 1162.
368. Id.at 1166.
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The Roommates.com case addressed an important issue-what is
the level of online conduct by a website owner that will defeat
immunity. While there have been other cases that have indirectly
addressed the issue, Roommates.com is the first case to directly
confront this issue. The issue was raised in this case because, as noted
above, unlike message boards, blogs, or other forms of online
communication, Roommates.com asked questions regarding sex,
sexual orientation, and whether the person has children as part of the
sign up process. 3 69 According to the plaintiffs, these questions, if
asked offline, allegedly violated Fair Housing laws. Additionally,
Roommates.corn also had a search engine that permitted users to
search for potential roommates based upon allegedly discriminatory
categories.37°
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the CDA did not provide
immunity for certain portions of the Roommates.com website.371
Regarding the mandatory posted questions, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Rommates.com did not have immunity under the
CDA.372
Roommates.com created the questions and choice of answers,
and designed its website registration process around them. Therefore,
Roommates.com is undoubtedly the "information content provider" as
to the questions and can claim no immunity for posting them on its
website, or for forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of
using its services.
The CDA does not grant immunity for inducing third parties to
express illegal preferences. Roommates.com's own acts-posting the
questionnaire and requiring answers to it-are entirely its own doing
and thus section 230 of the CDA does not apply to them.
Roommates.com is entitled to no immunity. 373
369. Id. at 1161.
370. Id. at 1167.
371. Id. at 1167.
372. Id. at 1165.
373. Id. ("The salient fact in Carafano was that the website's classifications of user
characteristics did absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the message, to
encourage defamation or to make defamation easier: The site provided neutral tools specifically
designed to match romantic partners depending on their voluntary inputs. By sharp contrast,
Roommate's website is designed to force subscribers to divulge protected characteristics and
discriminatory preferences, and to match those who have rooms with those who are looking for
rooms based on criteria that appear to be prohibited by the FHA.") Id. at 1172.
2009]
940 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
This was because, by posting the mandatory questionnaire,
Roommates.com helped develop, at least in part, the content.374 The
Ninth Circuit also addressed whether Roommates.com had immunity
for the allegedly discriminatory comments made by users in the
"Additional Comments" section. The court concluded that
Roommates.com had immunity for these statements since it, unlike in
the other portions of the site, did not "develop" the content.3 75
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the search engine and email
notification system created by Roommates.com that permitted users
to search for roommates based upon allegedly discriminatory
categories. This search engine was not a generic search engine that
could be used to search upon discriminatory categories, but rather one
376that was explicitly based upon allegedly discriminatory categories.
Roommates.com's search function is similarly designed to steer
users based on discriminatory criteria.37 7 Roommates.com's search
engine thus differs materially from generic search engines such as
Google, Yahoo! and MSN Live Search, in that Roommates.com
designed its system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the
results of each search, and to force users to participate in its
discriminatory process.
378
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that immunity under the CDA
did not exist for placing the same allegedly discriminatory categories
in search fields in a search engine.379
Two other prior Ninth Circuit decisions were then discussed and
clarified by the court. The conclusion that minor editorial changes
under Batzel were subject to immunity was affirmed, though the
court, without directly addressing the issue, appeared to question
374. Id. at 1165 (noting that this portion of its holding was consistent with its prior holding
in Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Anthony v. Yahoo Inc., 421
F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263-64 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
375. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1173-74 ("Roommate publishes these comments as
written. It does not provide any specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does
it urge subscribers to input discriminatory preferences. Roommate is not responsible, in whole
or in part, for the development of this content, which comes entirely from subscribers and is
passively displayed by Roommate. Without reviewing every essay, Roommate would have no
way to distinguish unlawful discriminatory preferences from perfectly legitimate statements.
Nor can there be any doubt that this information was tendered to Roommate for publication
online. This is precisely the kind of situation for which section 230 was designed to provide
immunity.") (internal citations omitted).
376. ld. at 1167.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1170.
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whether the editor in that case actually fell within the CDA.3"° The
court also recognized the distinction between choosing what material
is placed in an online posting from an editorial perspective versus
making the choice to publish material online in the first place; while
the former falls within CDA immunity, the latter does not.381
The court also clarified its holding in Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com. Inc., limiting its prior conclusion: "We correctly
held that the website was immune, but incorrectly suggested that it
could never be liable because 'no [dating] profile has any content
until a user actively creates it.' ''382 Going further in a footnote, the
court stated "We disavow any suggestion that Carafano holds an
information content provider automatically immune so long as the
content originated with another information content provider.
383
Instead, the court concluded that Carafano was correctly decided
because the content at issue was created and developed entirely by the
user, using neutral tools without prompting for help from the website
operator.384
D. The CDA and Social Networking
Social networking is a large part of web activity and one issue
that has arisen is the scope of CDA immunity in situations where the
service provider has played a role as an intermediary for improper
conduct, including issues with minors and other forms of alleged
sexual misconduct. Certain plaintiffs have alleged that social
networking sites know sexual predators are using their services and
380. Id. at 1170 ("Our opinion is entirely consistent with that part of Batzel which holds
that an editor's minor changes to the spelling, grammar and length of third-party content do not
strip him of section 230 immunity. None of those changes contributed to the libelousness of the
message, so they do not add up to 'development' as we interpret the term.").
381. Id. at 1170-71 ("The distinction drawn by Batzel anticipated the approach we take
today. As Batzel explained, if the tipster tendered the material for posting online, then the
editor's job was, essentially, to determine whether or not to prevent its posting-precisely the
kind of activity for which section 230 was meant to provide immunity. And any activity that can
be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is
perforce immune under section 230. But if the editor publishes material that he does not believe
was tendered to him for posting online, then he is the one making the affirmative decision to
publish, and so he contributes materially to its allegedly unlawful dissemination. He is thus
properly deemed a developer and not entitled to CDA immunity.") (internal citations and
footnotes omitted).
382. Id. at 1171 (quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.
2003)).
383. Id. at 1171 n.31.
384. Id. at 1171.
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therefore CDA immunity does not exist.385 This argument was
recently rejected by the Fifth Circuit when it found that MySpace was
immune from claims that it had allegedly failed to implement safety
procedures to prevent sexual predators from allegedly misusing
MySpace.386 The court did not consider the plaintiffs' argument that
MySpace lacked immunity under the CDA due to its alleged role in
creating the content due to an online questionnaire. However, it
should be noted that the Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in
Roommates.com, 387 and given the questionnaire as described in the
Doe v. MySpace, Inc. case, it would appear to fall within the "neutral"
category that would still support immunity.
E. Communications Decency Act-Immunity v. Defense
While certain courts have referred to the CDA as providing
immunity, other courts have characterized the CDA's protections as
not immunity from suit, but rather a defense to liability.388
F. Communications Decency Act-Disclosures by Interactive
Computer Services
Providers of interactive computer services must, at the time of
entering an agreement with a customer, notify the customer in an
appropriate manner that parental control protections are commercially
available and these protections may assist in limiting access to
material that is harmful to minors.3 89 The notice must identify, or
provide the customer with access to information identifying, current
providers of such protections.39 °
VIII.CLASS ACTION ISSUES IN PRIVACY LITIGATION
Class actions are a form of a lawsuit where a large group of
people, with similar claims, collectively litigate their claims in court
through a class representative that acts on their behalf. This type of
action is becoming more and more common in the privacy litigation
realm and a discussion of class action issues is included in the
385. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
386. ld. at 422.
387. Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1164.
388. Energy Automation Sys. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 2007 WL 1557202 at * 11
(M.D. Tenn. 2007).
389. 47 U.S.C. §230(d) (2000).
390. Id.
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following sections. Generally, in order to state a class action claim in
federal court, the plaintiff must comply with Rule 23(a) and this
includes showing: voluminous numbers of the parties; commonality
of legal and factual issues; typicality of claims and defenses of the
class represented; and adequacy of representation. 391 In addition to
these pre-requisites, a plaintiff must also show that the proposed class
of action fits within one or more of the categories of class actions
described in Rule 23(b).392
A. General Issues with Privacy Class Actions
One of the common issues in privacy litigation that defendants
address is the typicality requirement. In most cases typicality "refers
to the nature of the claim or defense of class representative, not to the
specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. 3 9 3 Another
common issue that is raised by defendants is that the represented
parties do not have common interests with the class or that they are
unable to prosecute the action vigorously through qualified counsel.394
B. Class Actions in Federal Court-The Requirements of Rule
23
Class actions are not automatically permitted to proceed in court.
They must first be certified by the court and satisfy four threshold
requirements:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.395
Essentially, class actions involve the joinder of many people to
the action, most of which will not actually participate in the process.
On the joinder issue, a party need not show that joinder is impossible,
391. FED. R. Civ. P.23(a).
392. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
393. Hannon v. Data Prods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Weinberger v.
Thornton, 114 F.R.D. 599, 603 (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
394. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997); Lerwill v. Inflight
Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978).
395. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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just impracticable.396 Moreover, while the number of plaintiffs is the
main focus of numerosity, it need not be millions of plaintiffs to
qualify as a class action. Although a class of one million members
easily satisfies the numerosity requirement, some courts have found
that a number could be as a low as 40.397
Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement "is met if plaintiffs'
grievances share a common question of law or of fact." 398 This
requirement "is usually a minimal burden for a party to shoulder ' 399
because it does not require identical issues, but rather just that the
plaintiff identify "some unifying thread among the members' claims
that warrants class treatment. ' 4°° However, the common issues must
be expressed with some degree of particularity and specificity. 4 1' At
some level, courts merge the commonality and typicality
requirements.4 2 This issue was addressed regarding the disclosure of
396. "Impracticable does not mean impossible," however, and "the numerosity
requirement is satisfied when joinder of all putative class members would needlessly complicate
and hinder efficient resolution of the litigation." Karvaly v. eBay, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 71, 80
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Trief v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 144 F.R.D. 193, 198 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993); Parker v. Time Warner Entm't
Co., L.P., 239 F.R.D. 318, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 227
F.R.D. 65, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473,
482-83 (2d Cir. 1995).
397. See, e.g., In re Medical X-Ray Firm Antitrust Litig., 1997 WL 33320580, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1997) (finding numerosity prong satisfied where "the total class size would
amount to about 2000 dealers, hospitals, and other direct purchasers that are geographically
dispersed across the country"); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 476,
479 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding numerosity prong satisfied where "thousands of investors engaged
in transactions during the Class Period involving the securities that are the subject of this
litigation"). Moreover, the Second Circuit has recognized that "numerosity is presumed at a
level of 40 members," Consolidated Rail Corp, 47 F.3d at 483; Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936;
Indep. Energy, 210 F.R.D. at 479 ("While precise calculation of the number of class members is
not required, numbers in excess of forty generally satisfy the requirement.") (citations omitted).
398. Karvaly, 245 F.R.D. at 81 (quoting Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir.
1997)).
399. Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 211 F.R.D. 228, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
400. Kamean v. Local 363, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 109 F.R.D. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
401. Lewis Tree, 211 F.R.D. at 232 (finding commonality not present where the party "has
merely construed the factual basis of each class member's claim in the most general fashion...
[and] has not alleged that [the] products [at issue], and their multiple versions, were similar in
any respect, beyond the fact that they all purportedly contained Y2K defects and were
telecommunications products") (quoting Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th
Cir. 1998)).
402. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 239 F.R.D. 318, 329 (E.D.N.Y 2007) ("[T]he
commonality and typicality requirements 'tend to merge, because [b]oth serve as guideposts for
determining whether.., the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so inter-related that
the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence."')
(quoting Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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personally identifiable information in the Parker case and this court
found it sufficient that the legal theory and factual question were the
same-whether the class members were injured by the disclosure of
their personally identifiable information without notice.4 °3
Likewise, typicality does not require that "the factual
background of each named plaintiffs claim be identical to that of all
class members; rather, it requires that the disputed issue of law or fact
'occupy essentially the same degree of centrality to the named
plaintiffs claim as to that of other members of the proposed
class."' 40 4 In order to satisfy this requirement, "the plaintiffs must
show that their interests are aligned with the interests of their fellow
class members in order to ensure that each claim will be prosecuted
with diligence and care.'405 Typicality does not require that the
representative plaintiffs' claims be factually identical to all other class
members; "[n]evertheless, [their] claims must still share 'the same
essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.",4
06
The "adequacy of representation" prong is met if the named
plaintiffs "have typical claims, have no interests antagonistic to class
members, and be required to make the same showing as the absent
class members to establish defendants' liability. '40 7 It should be noted
that there is "no simple test for determining if a class will be
adequately represented by a named plaintiff' and "each case must be
approached on an individualized basis."408 The factors include "'the
representative's understanding and involvement in the lawsuit,' 'the
willingness to pursue the litigation,' and 'any conflict between the
representative and the class."'409
403. Parker, 239 F.R.D. at 329.
404. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 293 (quoting Krueger v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 433, 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
405. Kamean, 109 F.R.D. at 394; see also In re Medical X-Ray Film Antitrust Litig., 1997
WL 33320580, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1997); In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P'ships Litig.,
163 F.R.D. 200,208 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
406. Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 714 (11 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Appleyard v. Wallace,
754 F.2d 955, 958 (11 th Cir. 1985)); see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020
(9th Cir. 1998) ("Under [Rule 23(a)(3)'s] permissive standards, representative claims are
'typical' if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not
be substantially identical.").
407. Karvaly v. eBay, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting In re W. Union
Money Transfer Litig., 2004 WL 3709932, at * 15 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)).
408. Parker, 239 F.R.D. at 330 (quoting In re LILCO Sees. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 672
(E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
409. Id. (quoting LILCO Sees. Litig., 11 F.R.D. at 672).
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The party seeking certification bears the burden of establishing
these requirements.41 ° Courts will examine these issues closely,
though some of these elements tend to merge. 411 However, the class
certification procedure itself should not typically devolve into a mini-
trial on the merits of the individual or class claims.41 2
Additionally, courts previously implied the requirement that the
class be definite in order to be certified.41 3 While this is not a
prerequisite for certification under 23(a), amendments to Rule
23(c)(1)(B) now explicitly require that the order certifying the class
"must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses and
this is interpreted as codifying the prior implicit requirements."
If Rule 23(a) is not met then the court must dismiss the class
allegations, though it can permit the individual action to proceed.41 4
C. Rule 23(b)-A General Overview
If the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, the proposed class
must additionally satisfy one of the 3 provisions for certification
under Rule 23(b). 415 Rule 23(b) permits two forms of class actions-
mandatory and "opt-out" class actions. Mandatory class actions-those
under 23(b)(l)-(2) focus on classes with similar interests and, as a
result, do not require the court to give notice and a chance to opt-out
410. Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Berger v. Compaq
Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2001)); In re Medical X-Ray Film Antitrust Litig.,
1997 WL 33320580, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
411. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Marisol v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The crux of [commonality and
typicality] requirements is to ensure that 'maintenance of a class action is economical and [that]
the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class
members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.'")).
412. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974); Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc.
452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971); See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1232
(9th Cir. 1996); Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451,457 (11 th Cir. 1996); Adamson v.
Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1414 n.8
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Redditt v. Miss. Extended Care Ctr, Inc., 718 F.2d 1381, 1388 (5th Cir. 1983);
Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1982); Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen
Plumbers, etc., 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 64 (3d Cir.
1980); Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 540 F.2d 699, 707 (4th Cir. 1976); Weathers v.
Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1974); see Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553
F.2d 714, 718 n.l I (1st Cir. 1977).
413. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 2006 WL
2161887, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 546 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2008).
414. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964).
415. Cole v. GM Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2007); Karvaly v. eBay, Inc., 245
F.R.D. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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of the class. 4 16 Class actions brought under 23(b)(3) are opt-out class
actions and these require each class member to receive notice, and the
opportunity to opt-out of the class. 4 17 Opt-out rights and notice
provisions are especially important in the class context because the
rights of individual class members will be affected without their
actual participation.
The first of the options to meet the requirements of 23(b) is that
prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members
would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with
respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or adjudications
with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter,
would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests.418
The second is that the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.4 19 Under Rule 23(b)(2),
the class action can contain claims for monetary damages as long as
they are not "predominantly" sought and instead are "secondary to the
primary claim for injunctive or declaratory relief. '420 This typically
requires a review of the specific facts and circumstances of each case,
including the intent of the plaintiff in brining the suit.
421
Under Rule 23(b)(3) a class action is available where there are
common questions of law or fact that "predominate" over any
questions affecting only individual members and the class action
device is "superior" to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.422 This tests whether the
classes are "sufficiently" cohesive to justify adjudication by class
representation.423 The matters relevant to this finding include: the
class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
416. Klender v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 161, 166-67 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Coleman
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2002)).
417. Jd. at 168 (citing Coleman, 296 F.3d at 448).
418. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
419. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
420. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 2003).
421. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1186 (9th Cir. 2007).
422. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
423. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997).
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defense of separate actions; the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
members; the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and the likely
difficulties in managing a class action.424
The third is that the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.4 25
1. Examination of 23(b)(1)
The focus of a court's examination of a class action that qualifies
under 23(b)(1) is two-fold. For cases under 23(b)(1)(A), the focus is
on whether there is a risk that the defendant would be subject to
incompatible standards or judgments. This section "takes in cases
where the party is obliged by law to treat the members of the class
alike (a utility acting toward customers; a government imposing a
tax), or where the party must treat all alike as a matter of practical
necessity (a riparian owner using water as against downriver
owners). 426 In class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) one of the
factors courts consider is whether compensatory relief is the only
relief sought. This is because a class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is
not proper if purely monetary, and no declaratory or equitable, relief
is sought because the concern over incompatible standards is not
present.42 7
For cases under 23(b)(1)(B), the court examines whether
adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the individual adjudications, would
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.4 28
This typically occurs in "'limited fund' cases, instances in which
424. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(3).
425. Id.
426. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614.
427. Klender v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 161, 167 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing In re Dennis
Greenman Secs. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11 th Cir. 1987)); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg.,
Inc., 205 F.R.D, 466, 483 (S.D.Ohio 2001).
428. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614.
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numerous persons make claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy
all claims. 429
2. Examination of 23(b)(2)
When determining if 23(b)(2) is met, the court must examine
whether injunctive relief is the predominant remedy sought by the
plaintiffs. Said differently, Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in
which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly
to money damages.,'430 In the Second Circuit, the test used to
determine whether money damages are the predominant relief sought,
and therefore preclude class certification, is a so-called "ad hoc" test
that is based upon a valuation of the relief sought.431 The test states
that a district court:
[M]ay allow (b)(2) certification if it finds in its informed, sound
judicial discretion that (1) the positive weight or value to the
plaintiffs of the injunctive or declaratory relief sought is
predominant even though compensatory or punitive damages are
also claimed, and (2) class treatment would be efficient and
manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable measure of judicial
432
economy.
In determining whether injunctive or declaratory relief
predominates, the court must look at two factors and determine:
(1) even in the absence of a possible monetary recovery,
reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought; and (2) the injunctive or declaratory
relief sought would be both reasonably necessary and appropriate
were the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits. Insignificant or sham
requests for injunctive relief should not provide cover for (b)(2)
certification of claims that are brought essentially for monetary
recovery.
433
Applying this to the Parker case (one that sought relief for alleged
violation of the Cable Communications Policy Act), the court
429. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1996 amendment).
430. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 239 F.R.D. 318, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1996 amendment).
431. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
432. Id.
433. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164).
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concluded that injunctive relief was incidental to the damage claims
and therefore this element of Rule 23(b) was not met.434
3. Examination of 23(b)(3)
Examination under Rule 23(b) involves an analysis of whether
the "proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication
by representation. ' '435 The Second Circuit has found that "[c]lass-wide
issues predominate if resolution of some of the legal or factual
questions that qualify each class member's case as a genuine
controversy can be achieved through generalized proof, and if these
particular issues are more substantial than the issues subject only to
individualized proof. 4 36 As a result, the predominance inquiry is
somewhat related to the commonality and typicality requirement of
Rule 23(a), but it is typically seen as a stronger requirement.437
The Supreme Court has held that Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement was not met when the purported class members had all
been exposed to asbestos products supplied by the defendants, where
the class members "were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over
different periods. 438 The court in PayPal, concluded that the
predominance requirement was not met merely because the class
members accepted PayPal's user agreement, when in that case, only a
small number of claims had become claims for actual damages where
there were not common factual and legal issues.4 39
4. Notice under Rule 23(b)(3)
Because of procedural differences in classes under Rule 23(b)(2)
and 23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(3) classes can result in the waiver of
potential claims or defenses, due process concerns require that
putative class members receive notice that their claims are being
434. Id.
435. In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting In
re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also
Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
436. Moore v. Painewebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002).
437. See id.; Karvaly v. eBay, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 71, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
438. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,
626 (3d Cir. 1996) aff'd 521. U.S. 591 (1997)).
439. Karvaly, 245 F.R.D. at 84.
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adjudicated, or the class may not have res judicata effect.440 The
notice requirements are read strictly to require the "best notice
practicable" to the names and addresses that could be obtained
through reasonable means.441
D. Potential Defenses Based Upon Individual Reliance
One of the issues faced in privacy litigation, particularly claims
that rely upon individual statements to consumers, is individual
reliance. If the claim involves proving what each individual knew or
relied upon, such as in litigation related to reliance upon a privacy
policy, class claims may fail because they do not meet the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). 442
E. Examples of Class Actions Involving Privacy Concerns
In Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., the
court examined whether a class action was appropriate where the case
alleged violation of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.
In Parker, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated this law
by disclosing and selling personally identifiable information about
their subscribers to third parties and by failing to provide subscribers
with clear and conspicuous notice of its disclosure of such
information. 444 Specifically, Time Warner was alleged to have
collected "detailed" personal information about and from subscribers
and sold this information to third parties, including telemarketers,
direct marketing services companies, and other Time Warner
affiliates and divisions." 5 The case also alleged that Time Warner did
not comply with the notice requirements of this Act.446 This case was
a class action in which the parties sought to settle the case via a
proposed settlement that included class certification, and the court
rejected the proposal because it did not meet the requirements of Rule
440. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 239 F.R.D. 318, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see
also In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977); Abrams v. Interco
Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 30 (2d Cir. 1983); Besinga v. United States, 923 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1991).
441. Parker, 239 F.R.D. at 334.
442. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Simon v. Merrill
Lynch., 482 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1973).
443. Parker, 239 F.R.D. at 320.
444. Id.
445. Id. at321.
446. Id.
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23 in addition to grounds that damage claims predominated and that
notice was not appropriate.447
F. California Class Action Issues
Most states have developed their own standards for determining
whether class actions are appropriate. 448  In California, class
certification is a procedural tool that may be used only where the
common questions of fact or law predominate over those particular to
individual plaintiffs. As a conceptual starting point, it should be noted
that,
each member must not be required to individually litigate
numerous and substantial questions to determine his right to
recover following the class judgment; and the issues which may be
jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate
adjudication, must be sufficiently numerous and substantial to
make the class action advantageous to the judicial process and to
the litigants.449
But "a class action cannot be maintained where each member's
right to recover depends on facts peculiar to his case.' 45°
California has codified its requirements in Code of Civil
Procedure § 382.451 California courts have held that before a class
447. Id. at 342.
448. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 382 (Deering 2008).
449. Wash. Mut. Bank, v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1076 (Cal. 2001) (citing San Jose
v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 710 (Cal. 1974)); Linder v. Thrifty Oil, 2 P.3d 27, 31 (Cal.
2000) ("By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at
the same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides
small claimants with a method of obtaining redress .... Generally, a class suit is appropriate
when numerous parties suffer injury of insufficient size to warrant individual action and when
denial of class relief would result in unjust advantage to the wrongdoer. But because group
action also has the potential to create injustice, trial courts are required to carefully weigh
respective benefits and burdens and to allow maintenance of the class action only where
substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and the courts.") (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
450. San Jose, 525 P.2d at 709; see also Kennedy v. Baxter Heathcare Corp., 43 Cal. App.
4th 799, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
451. These elements are at times framed in different ways, all courts require the same
elements, though some are framed as sub-elements. "Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes class suits in California when the question is one of a common or general interest, of
many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court. To obtain certification, a party must establish the existence of both an ascertainable
class and a well-defined community of interest among the class members. The community of
interest requirement involves three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact;
(2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
representatives who can adequately represent the class. Other relevant considerations include the
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action can be maintained under Section 382, the plaintiff must first
show two basic elements: (1) the existence of an ascertainable class,
and (2) a well-defined community of interest among the class
members.452
1. Ascertainable class
The first element under Section 382 is ascertainment of the class.
A class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs
by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow
members of that group to identify themselves as having a right to
recover based on the description.453 This requires an objective
definition of the persons in the class-that is, who they are, and how, if
notice is required, they can be told about the case and their interest in
it. Ascertainability is further determined by examining the size of the
class and the means available for identifying class members.454 In
other words, can the alleged class be located with reasonable
efficiency, i.e. without unreasonable expense or delay? 455  In
examining these issues, courts have had to consider whether the class
can be determined by the defendants' records.456 In other cases, class
actions have failed because the class can only be identified by
individuals self-identifying.457
2. Community of interest
The community of interest requirement is based upon three
factors: (a) predominant common questions of law or fact, (b) class
representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class, and (c)
class representatives who can adequately represent the class.458
probability that each class member will come forward ultimately to prove his or her separate
claim to a portion of the total recovery and whether the class approach would actually serve to
deter and redress alleged wrongdoing." Linder, 2 P.3d at 31 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). In reality, California Courts borrow from the Federal Rules regarding the elements
necessary to satisfy a class action.
452. See Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 27-28 (Cal. 1981); Vasquez v.
Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 969 (Cal. 1971).
453. Reyes v. Board of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1270-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
454. Id. at 1274.
455. See Hypolite v. Carelson, 52 Cal. App. 3d 566, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
456. See Daar v. Yellow Cab. Co., 433 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1967).
457. Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Asso., 198 P.2d 514, 517, 519 (Cal. 1948).
458. Richmond v. Dart Indus. Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 28 (Cal. 1981); see also Reese v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1234 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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3. Predominant questions of law or fact
This element generally examines whether "[c]ommon issues
would be the principal issues in any individual action, both in terms
of time to be expended in their proof and of their importance." 49
Class certification is inappropriate in cases where liability and
damages are highly individual in nature.460 As an example, this
element was satisfied in one matter where a plaintiff alleged that
thousands of deeds of trust contained identical impound account
provisions that were entered into between a bank and its customers
who applied for real estate loans. In this case, the plaintiffs showed
that the preprinted form contracts containing the challenged impound
account provisions constituted contracts of adhesion.46'
While individual damages can cause denial of class certification,
some courts have held that mere differences in computing damages is
not sufficient to deny class certification.4 2 However, differences
regarding whether damages exist, or the manner in which they are
incurred, are appropriate considerations.463 In one case, the court
found that although determination of the alleged unconscionability of
what was clearly a contract of adhesion was common to the class,
individual differences relating to damages went beyond mere
problems of calculation, but rather involved differences as to each
individual class member's entitlement to damages.464
4. Typicality
This factor generally examines whether the class representatives'
claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as those of other
class members. California courts have held this requirement does not
necessitate that the interests of the class representatives be identical
with those of the class.465 Rather, the requirement is that the class
459. Caro v. Proctor & Gamble, 18 Cal. App. 4th 644, 667-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(quoting Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 970 (Cal. 1971)).
460. See San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 709 (Cal. 1974).
461. McGhee v. Bank of Am., 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
462. See Wilens v. TD Waterhouse Group, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 746, 756 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987).
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representatives be situated similarly to the class's other members.46 6
In showing typicality, the fundamental requirement is that the plaintiff
seeking to represent the class actually be a member of the class.46 7
An example of a case where class certification was denied due to
this issue is Caro.468 In Caro, the plaintiff asserted claims for fraud,
violation of a number of statutes, including Business & Professions
Code Section 17200, and violation of the CLRA, based on allegations
that the class members-buyers of the orange juice-"were deceived by
the product's labeling and advertising into believing they were buying
'fresh' orange juice.,,469 The Court of Appeal held that the
representative plaintiffs claims were atypical of the class because at
deposition he contradicted the allegations made in the complaint by
stating that he had not believed that the orange juice products were
fresh and also stated that he did not read the entirety of the orange
juice labels.470
5. Adequate representation
In order to be deemed an adequate class representative, the class
action proponent must show she has claims or defenses that are
typical of the class, and that she can adequately represent the class.47'
This element requires a showing that the class representatives can
adequately represent the class, and is related to the typicality
requirement discussed above. Generally, the adequacy analysis
examines whether the class representative's claims are free of
irreconcilable conflicts.472 The key element in determining the class
466. See Classen v. Weller, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Global Minerals
& Metals Corp. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 63 P.3d 913, 918 (Cal. 2003)).
467. Caro v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 644, 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
("[t]he cases uniformly hold that a plaintiff seeking to maintain a class action must be a member
of the class he claims to represent") (citing Chem v. Bank of Am., 544 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Cal.
1976)); see Caro, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 662 (The determination that a representative plaintiffs
claims are atypical of the class, on its own, is "sufficient to defeat class certification" under
Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and the CLRA.).
468. Caro, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 666.
469. Caro, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 664.
470. Caro, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 664-65; Chern, 544 P.2d at 1315 (if the plaintiff was not
misled, she cannot represent those who were); see also Starbucks v. Superior Court, 168 Cal.
App. 4th 1436, 144748 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding dismissal was proper because the named
plaintiffs had not been convicted of the relevant marijuana offenses and had also read and
understood the disclaimer, and therefore did not represent the proposed class).
471. Global Minerals, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 854 (citing Lockheed Martin, 63 P.3d at 918).
472. La Sala v. Am. Say. & Loan Assn., 480 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Cal. 1971).
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representative's adequacy is that person's ability and willingness to
pursue the class members' claims vigorously.473 This element also
examines the competency of counsel.474
6. Additional showing-substantial benefit to the court and
litigants
In addition to the above, the proponent of class certification must
also show substantial benefit to the court and litigants, and this
generally contemplates a balancing test to determine whether the
benefit to litigants and the court is sufficient to justify class action.475
7. No consideration of the merits
As in federal court, California courts typically do not consider
the merits of the case when ruling upon class certification.476
However, where issues affecting the merits of a case are enmeshed
with class action requirements, such as whether substantially similar
questions are common to the class and predominate over individual
questions, a court is authorized to scrutinize a proposed class cause of
action to determine whether it is suitable for resolution on a class-
wide basis.477
8. Application to privacy litigation
There have been a number of privacy litigation matters brought
as class actions in California, and one of the most common is for
violation of Civil Code § 1747.08478. The court in Linder v. Thrifty
Oil,479 examined the elements of a class action in this context and it
provides a good example of certain issues. In Linder, the plaintiff
moved to certify the case as a class action with two plaintiff
classes.480 The first class was called the "the surcharge class," and it
consisted of more than a million California residents who were
allegedly compelled to pay an illegal surcharge of roughly 4 cents per
473. See Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. UPS, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
474. See id.
475. Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755, 385 (Cal. 1976) (citing San Jose
v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 709 (Cal. 1974)).
476. Green v. Obledo, 624 P.2d 256, 268 (Cal. 1981).
477. Quacchia v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 122 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1454 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
478. This statute was previously numbered as § 1748.8.
479. Linder v. Thrifty Oil, 2 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2000).
480. Id. at 30.
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gallon more than customers paying in cash.48 l The second class,
called "the penalty class," was comprised of individuals who used
their credit cards to make purchases at service stations that allegedly
violated the law by using credit card forms with a preprinted space for
cardholders to fill in their telephone numbers.482
In examining the class certification issues, the trial court denied
class certification, partly on the basis that class members would not
receive substantial benefit due to the costs and potential recovery-a
conclusion that was rejected by the court because it did not share the
conclusion that notice by first class mail was required in this case.4 83
It also rejected this conclusion because it noted that
[I]t is firmly established that the benefits of certification are not
measured by reference to individual recoveries alone. Not only do
class actions offer consumers a means of recovery for modest
individual damages, but such actions often produce "several
salutary by-products, including a therapeutic effect upon those
sellers who indulge in fraudulent practices, aid to legitimate
business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate competition, and
avoidance to the judicial process of the burden of multiple
litigation involving identical claims."
484
Thus, the amount of potential recovery, while significant, was not the
only factor to consider, which resulted in the denial of class
certification being reversed.485
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 37 ("The trial court denied class certification for the additional reason that class
members would not receive any substantial benefit. While the court did not address potential
recoveries of penalty class members, it did conclude that the individual damages of surcharge
class members, if any, 'would be small, perhaps not enough to support the required mailings to
and from the class.' The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the surcharge claim, even if
legally correct, would not confer substantial benefits because the burden of identifying class
members and providing notice would be too high in relation to the small amount of the potential
recovery.").
484. Id. at 38 (citing Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69 (Cal. 1971)).
485. Id. at 39 ("While the potential amount of each individual recovery is a significant
factor in weighing the benefits of a class action, it is not the only factor requiring consideration.
By incorrectly limiting the scope of the relevant inquiry, the lower courts here did not evaluate
whether the proposed class suit is the only effective way to halt and redress the alleged
wrongdoing, or to prevent unjust advantage to Thrifty. Moreover, the Court of Appeal assumed
that substantial time and expense would be required to provide legally adequate notice to class
members, even though the trial court had yet to take evidence and rule on the matter.
Accordingly, without intimating any view on the matter, we find it appropriate to leave this
issue to the trial court for reexamination.").
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G. TCPA Claims and Class Certification
There is a split among courts regarding whether a TCPA claim
can be brought as a class action.4 86 However, even in the courts that
permit class actions,48 7 plaintiffs have faced issues proving that a
permissible class exists regarding a number of the requirements,
including numerocity, 488 commonality,4 89 typicality,490 as well as the
higher burdens of 23(b)(3) because "these cases require an
examination of a series of individual transmissions under individual
circumstances.,, 491 Other courts have rejected these findings regarding
class certification of TCPA claims and permitted classes to be
certified.4 92
H. Pleading
The damage issues faced in privacy ligation also impact class
certification.493
IX. CLASS ACTION DISCOVERY
The California Supreme Court has addressed the permissible
scope of class action discovery in Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc., v.
Superior Court.4 94 The Court of Appeal had ruled that a class action
plaintiff could not obtain the names and contact information of other
potential plaintiffs, who had also allegedly complained about the
product at issue in the case, without a letter being sent to the potential
486. Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding New York
law did not permit class actions under the TCPA).
487. Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 886, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (finding
that class actions under the TCPA could be permissibly brought if California's class action
requirements were met).
488. See McGaughey v. Treistman, 2007 WL 24935 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2008).
489. Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Penn. 1995) (denying class
certification and stating that "courts have been unwilling to find commonality where the
resolution of 'common issues' depends on factual determinations that will be different for each
class plaintiff").
490. Id. at 404 ("Although plaintiff relies on the same legal theory as the purported class,
namely 47 U.S.C. § 227, as discussed with regard to the commonality question, his claims do
not arise from the same event or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class
members.")
491. See id.
492. Hinman v. M & M Rental Ctr., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 802, 804 (N.D. II1. 2008).
493. Melancon v. La. Office of Student Fin. Assistance, 567 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 (E.D.
La. 2008) (rejecting class action arising from alleged loss of data because damages were
speculative).
494. See Pioneer Elecs. (USA), Inc., v. Superior Court, 150 P.3d 198, 199 (Cal. 2007).
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plaintiffs and the individuals affirmatively consenting to the
disclosure.495 The Supreme Court reviewed this decision and
ultimately reversed the Court of Appeal. The court first noted the
general formulation of invasion of privacy claims in California, as
expressed by Hill, which is that the claimant must possess a "legally
protected privacy interest," there must be a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the particular circumstances, including "customs,
practices and physical settings surrounding particular activities," and
the invasion of privacy must be "serious" in nature and the actual or
potential impact must be an "egregious" breach of social norms.496
The Court of Appeal had required Colonial Life notices to the other
potential plaintiffs and required the letter to seek affirmative consent
before disclosure could occur, rather than giving the individual the
option to "opt-out" and have disclosure occur if there was silence.4 97
Here, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a somewhat
reduced expectation of privacy due to the fact that the consumers at
issue were ones that had complained and that disclosure of contact
information, particularly with a right to opt-out, was not a serious
invasion of privacy.498 It also noted that some consumers might
actually prefer that their information be disclosed in this context.
Thus, it concluded that a letter that informed the consumers of their
right to object, with an opt-out right, was sufficient.499
In a recent case, the Court of Appeal addressed the scope of class
action discovery where the members of the class had executed forms
that purportedly impacted their expectation of privacy.500 In this case
the class arose from an alleged violation of California labor laws.50,
The defendant employer had its current employees execute a form
that gave them a choice regarding whether they desired to have their
information disclosed to third parties, including in the class action
context.5 °2 The defendant argued that as a result of most employees
495. Id. at 201.
496. Id. at 204 (citing Hills v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 856 P.2d 633, 654-55 (Cal.
1994)).
497. Id. at 201 (Colonial Life letters refer to the process identified in the insurance arena
for disclosure of other insureds pursuant to the California Supreme Court's holding in Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d 86 (1982)).
498. See id. at 205-06.
499. Id. at 205, 207.
500. Crab Addison v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 4th 958, 967 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
501. Id. at 961.
502. Id. at 962-63.
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choosing not to disclose, an "opt-in" class notice should be used.
50 3
The court examined its recent decision in Puerto v. Superior Court,
5°4
which examined a similar issue, albeit without the form in question.
The court noted that in its prior ruling that while discovery is quite
broad:
[It] "is not absolute, particularly where issues of privacy are
involved. The right of privacy in the California Constitution (art. I,
§ 1), 'protects the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
against a serious invasion."' The court must balance the public
need against the weight of the privacy right. This "requires a
careful evaluation of the privacy right asserted, the magnitude of
the imposition on that right, and the interests militating for and
against any intrusion on privacy." In conducting this evaluation,
we must determine whether the person claiming the privacy right
has a "'legally protected privacy interest"'; whether the person has
a "reasonable expectation of privacy under the particular
circumstances, including the customs, practices, and physical
settings surrounding particular activities"; and whether the
invasion of privacy is serious rather than trivial.
50 5
[T]he requested information, while personal, [was] not particularly
sensitive, as it [was] merely contact information, not medical or
financial details, political affiliations, sexual relationships, or
personal information. The employees had been identified by Wild
Oats as witnesses; contact information for witnesses ordinarily is
produced during discovery, and "it is neither unduly personal nor
overly intrusive. We concluded that there was 'no evidence that
disclosure of the contact information for these already identified
witnesses [was] a transgression of the witnesses' privacy that [was]
sufficiently serious in [its] nature, scope, and actual or potential
impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms
underlying the privacy right.", 
6
Ultimately the court examined the form at issue in the case and was
not convinced that the form impacted the employees' expectation of
privacy, particularly in connection with what it considered to be a
waiver of class action notice.50 7
503. Id. at 963.
504. Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
505. Crab Addison, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 966 (citing Puerto, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 1250-
51).
506. Puerto, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 1253-54 (quoting Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994)).
507. Crab Addison, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 970.
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The California Court of Appeal examined these issues in Alch v.
Superior Court. 508 In this case, television writers filed class-action
lawsuits against a number of different defendants alleging industry-
wide practice of age discrimination.50 9 As part of the discovery
process, privacy notices were sent to 47,000 Writers Guild members
advising the members of their right to object to the disclosure of their
information based upon privacy concerns. 1 ° Information was sought
to try to provide input for statistical analysis as well as the
representation practices of employers and talent agencies. 51' The
initial subpoena sought sensitive information as well as non-sensitive
information, but the subpoenas were later modified over time.512 The
prior requests included requests for social security numbers, but these
were later redacted as part of the protective order in place in the
case.
5 13
The court began the examination of the issue by reviewing the
Pioneer Electronics case, as well as the Hill case. The court noted that
in order to assess whether a discovery order that implicated privacy
rights was proper, the court must first look at whether the privacy
claimant possesses a legally protected privacy interest. 514 Typically
there are two general types of privacy under this analysis: autonomy
privacy, which was identified as the interest in making intimate
personal decisions or conducting personal activities without
observation, intrusion or interference, as well as informational
privacy, which is the interest "in precluding the dissemination or
misuse of sensitive or confidential information., 51 5 The privacy
claimant must also have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
specific circumstances, including the "customs, practices and physical
settings surrounding a particular activities [which] may create or
inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy., 516 Third, to be actionable,
invasions of privacy "must be sufficiently serious in their nature,
scope and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach
508. Alch v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1412 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
509. Id. at 1416.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Seeid at 1418.
513. Seeid. at 1436.
514. Id. at 1423.
515. Id. (quoting Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994)).
516. Id. (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 655).
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of the social norms of the underlying privacy right."517 Finally, the
court noted that if these three criteria were met then the privacy
interest must "be measured against other competing or countervailing
interests in a 'balancing' test."
5 18
Ultimately, the court concluded that the criteria for invasion of
privacy were established and that this invasion was serious, but that
the writers in the case had demonstrated the information was
"directly" relevant to their claims and "essential to the fair resolution"
of their lawsuit.519 The court did note, however, that information
sought in this case was not confidential information that is the type of
sensitive information typically found in personnel files, and therefore
520distinguished the cases.
Ultimately, in completing its analysis of this issue, the court
noted that the demographic data sought by plaintiffs in this case,
which included name, date of birth, date of death, gender, race, and
residential zip code, was not "sensitive" information. 521
One issue that arose in connection with a claim for an alleged
violation of Penal Code § 632 is whether the named plaintiffs in a
proposed class action could seek discovery from the defendant of the
names of potential class members who were allegedly illegally
wiretapped.522 In this case, the defendant only provided the account
number and not names or contact information. 23 The defendant
argued that to permit the discovery would permit the plaintiffs to
abuse the discovery process because they did not have standing to file
the case in the first instance.5 24 The court disagreed, finding that it
517. Id. (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 655).
518. Id. at 1423-24 (quoting Pioneer Elecs. (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 150 P.3d 198,
204 (Cal. 2007)).
519. Id. at 1425 (quoting Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 775(Cal. 1978)).
520. Compare Alch, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 1433, with Harding Lawson Assocs. v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. App. 4th 7, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court's discovery order
was overbroad and unjustified because it required the production of confidential information
contained in personnel files of employees other than the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had not
shown a compelling need for the particular confidential documents in the third-party personnel
files), and Bd. of Trustees. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
521. Alch, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 1435; see Pureto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 4th
1242, 1253 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
522. CashCall v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 4th 273, 278, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
523. Id. at 280.
524. Id. at 281.
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was proper in this case to permit precertification discovery and an
amendment of the pleading.525
X. CONCLUSION
Privacy litigation presents some of the most high-stakes
litigation in an arena where the bases of the claims are often opaque.
Given the ever-increasing value of information, coupled with
increasing public concern, privacy litigation is here to stay and will
only increase in the future as both consumers and businesses take
steps to protect their most sensitive information.
525. "We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Parris
balancing test and concluding the rights and interests of the class members outweighed the
potential for abuse of the class action procedure in the circumstances of this case. In deciding
whether to grant or deny a motion for precertification discovery of the identities of class
members, a trial court, in applying the Parris balancing test, "must ... expressly identify any
potential abuses of the class action procedure that may be created if the discovery is permitted,
and weigh the danger of such abuses against the rights of the parties under the circumstances."
Id. at 292 (citing Parris v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 285, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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